BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION



STATE OF CALIFORNIA



ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE PETER V. ALLEN, presiding

)	EVIDENTIARY
)	HEARING
)	
Order Instituting Investigation on)	
the Commission's Own Motion to)	
Consider the Ratemaking and Other)	
Implications of a Proposed Plan for)	
Resolution of Voluntary Case filed)	
by Pacific Gas and Electric Company,)	
oursuant to Chapter 11 of the)	Investigation
Bankruptcy Code, in the United)	19-09-016
States Bankruptcy Court, Northern)	
District of California, San)	
Francisco Division, In re Pacific)	
Gas and Electric Corporation and)	
Pacific Gas and Electric Company,)	
Case No.19-30088.)	

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1	SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
2	MARCH 4, 2020 - 9:00 A.M.
3	* * * *
4	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ALLEN: On the
5	record. Good morning, everybody. This is
6	the evidentiary hearing in Investigation
7	19-09-016. I'm Administrative Law Judge
8	Peter Allen. I do believe that this will be
9	the last day of evidentiary hearings. Am I
10	correct?
11	MR. ALCANTAR: We hope so.
12	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes, your Honor.
13	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Weissmann.
14	Everyone now, "Yes, your Honor."
15	ALL COUNSEL: Yes, your Honor.
16	ALJ ALLEN: So the order of witnesses
17	we have for today is Dalzell, Beach, Gorman,
18	and then Long and/or Finkelstein. I know
19	parties were looking at some of their
20	cross-estimates. Are there any revisions on
21	the cross estimates?
22	Mr. Bloom.
23	MR. BLOOM: Yes, your Honor. We think
24	Gorman, Long, and Beach we're going to try to
25	keep it to about 20 minutes.
26	ALJ ALLEN: Gorman, Long, and Beach,
27	20 minutes for TCC. Okay.
28	MR. BLOOM: That should accommodate,

knocks it down quite a bit. And according to 1 2. what other, obviously, people are asking, we may even be able to tighten it from there. 3 ALJ ALLEN: I didn't see that you had 4 cross for Gorman. 5 It should have been in 6 MR. BLOOM: 7 there I'm pretty sure. ALJ ALLEN: I have you listed as 60 --8 9 what I have listed is 60 for Long and 60 for 10 Finkelstein. 11 MR. BLOOM: It's probably at 60 for 12 Gorman also, your Honor. 13 MR. WEISSMANN: That's what I show too, 14 your Honor. 15 ALJ ALLEN: Is which? 16 MR. WEISSMANN: According to my 17 records, TCC reserved 90 minutes for Gorman. 18 ALJ ALLEN: Okay. So you have 19 20 minutes for Gorman? 2.0 MR. BLOOM: Yeah, I think we should be 21 able to keep it down to about 20, maybe a 22 little bit longer. 2.3 ALJ ALLEN: Okay. And then do you 24 still have 60 for Finkelstein? 25 MR. BLOOM: I said none for Finkelstein. 26 27 ALJ ALLEN: None for Finkelstein. 2.8 Okay. Any other modifications?

1	MR. BLOOM: And I let them know last
2	night.
3	ALJ ALLEN: Off the record.
4	(Off the record.)
5	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
6	Any other housekeeping to do before
7	we call the first witness?
8	Seeing none, Ms. Koss.
9	MS. KOSS: Good morning, your Honor.
10	CUE would like to call Tom Dalzell.
11	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
12	Off the record.
13	(Off the record.)
14	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
15	TOM DALZELL, called as a witness by Coalition of California Utility
16	Employees, having been sworn, testified as follows:
17	
18	THE WITNESS: I do.
19	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. Please be
20	seated, state your full name spelling your
21	last name.
22	THE WITNESS: Tom Dalzell,
23	D-a-l-z-e-l-1.
24	ALJ ALLEN: Ms. Koss.
25	DIRECT EXAMINATION
26	BY MS. KOSS:
27	Q Good morning, Mr. Dalzell. Do you
28	have in front of you what has been marked as

_	
1	Exhibit CUE-01, which is the Testimony of Tom
2	Dalzell on Behalf of the Coalition of
3	California Utility Employees?
4	A Yes.
5	Q And was that testimony prepared by
6	you or under your direction?
7	A Yes.
8	Q And is it true and correct to the
9	best of your knowledge?
10	A Yes.
11	Q Are you sponsoring that testimony?
12	A Yes.
13	Q Thank you.
14	Mr. Dalzell is available for
15	cross-examination.
16	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
17	I believe the cross on Mr. Dalzell
18	is by Mr. Geesman.
19	MR. GEESMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
20	CROSS-EXAMINATION
21	BY MR. GEESMAN:
22	Q Good morning, Mr. Dalzell.
23	A Morning.
24	Q My name is John Geesman. I
25	represent the Alliance for Nuclear
26	Responsibility. Our interest in this
27	proceeding is focused on the impact of PG&E's
28	Plan of Reorganization to ratepayers.

1	Besides your extensive background as the
2	business manager of IBEW Local 1245, you also
3	serve as the Chair of the California Citizens
4	Compensation Commission, do you not?
5	A Yes, I'm appointed by the governor
6	to that commission.
7	Q Could you describe what the
8	commission does.
9	A It sets the wages for members of
10	the legislature and the constitutional
11	officers.
12	Q How many members are on the
13	commission?
14	A When its completely staffed, there
15	are five of us.
15 16	are five of us. Q And how long have you been on the
16	Q And how long have you been on the
16 17	Q And how long have you been on the commission?
16 17 18	Q And how long have you been on the commission? A Seven or eight years.
16 17 18 19	Q And how long have you been on the commission? A Seven or eight years. Q When does your term end?
16 17 18 19 20	Q And how long have you been on the commission? A Seven or eight years. Q When does your term end? A I don't know.
16 17 18 19 20 21	Q And how long have you been on the commission? A Seven or eight years. Q When does your term end? A I don't know. Q Your testimony at page four, lines
16 17 18 19 20 21	Q And how long have you been on the commission? A Seven or eight years. Q When does your term end? A I don't know. Q Your testimony at page four, lines one through eight describes a concern about,
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q And how long have you been on the commission? A Seven or eight years. Q When does your term end? A I don't know. Q Your testimony at page four, lines one through eight describes a concern about, and I'm quoting, "instability within the
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Q And how long have you been on the commission? A Seven or eight years. Q When does your term end? A I don't know. Q Your testimony at page four, lines one through eight describes a concern about, and I'm quoting, "instability within the bargaining unit," close quote, related to the
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Q And how long have you been on the commission? A Seven or eight years. Q When does your term end? A I don't know. Q Your testimony at page four, lines one through eight describes a concern about, and I'm quoting, "instability within the bargaining unit," close quote, related to the high level of compensation for PG&E linemen

1	A I see lines one through eight.
2	Q Okay. How many of your members
3	would you categorize as PG&E linemen in the
4	Bay Area?
5	A Well, I can't tell you exactly.
6	Perhaps 300. The definition of the Bay Area
7	shifts for different purposes. For the
8	purposes of the linemen compensation that we
9	negotiated, it does not include Concord. For
10	other purposes, it would.
11	Q So how many linemen then would be
12	included in the Concord area?
13	A In the Concord area?
14	Q Yeah.
15	A 20, 30.
16	Q And how does that overall number
17	compare to the number of members you have at
18	Diablo Canyon?
19	A Diablo Canyon is around 500. You
20	can do the arithmetic.
21	Q Do you recall in 2018 when several
22	of the signatories to the Diablo Canyon
23	Retirement Joint Proposal, including the IBEW
24	and A4NR, my client, successfully
25	co-sponsored Senator Monning's SB-1090, which
26	significantly augmented the employee
27	retention package approved by this commission
28	for your members at Diablo Canyon?

1	MS. KOSS: Objection, your Honor;
2	outside the scope of the testimony.
3	ALJ ALLEN: Foundational. Overruled.
4	THE WITNESS: I'm answering?
5	ALJ ALLEN: Yes.
6	BY MR. GEESMAN:
7	Q Do you recall that?
8	A I would not describe it that way,
9	but I know what you're talking about.
10	Q What would your characterization
11	be?
12	A I would say that the legislation
13	reinstated the collectively-bargained
14	agreement for retention at Diablo Canyon.
15	Q I stand by your clarification, sir.
16	Thank you. In terms of tensions over
17	compensation within the bargaining unit, are
18	the situations with the Bay Area linemen and
19	the Diablo Canyon work force similar?
20	A The overriding concern in both
21	situations was retention. So, in that
22	regard, yes.
23	Q Would it be correct to assume that
24	your strategy in dealing with the PG&E
25	bankruptcy has been to prioritize the common
26	interests of the entire 12,000 members?
2627	interests of the entire 12,000 members? A I think so.

1	Cross-Examination Exhibit A4NR-X-08.
2	Your Honor, I'd ask that that be
3	marked.
4	ALJ ALLEN: Exhibit Alliance for
5	Nuclear Responsibility Cross-Examination
6	Exhibit 2019 Joint Proxy Statement is
7	identified as A4NR-X-08.
8	(Exhibit No. A4NR-X-08 was marked for identification.)
10	BY MR. GEESMAN:
11	Q That's an excerpt from PG&E's joint
12	proxy statement from last year. On the last
13	page of the exhibit, you'll see a section
14	identified as "Principal Executive Officers
15	Pay Ratio 2018." Do you see that?
16	A I do.
17	Q I'm going to read the second
18	sentence of that section to you and ask if
19	I've read it correctly. The sentence reads,
20	"The total compensation of the median
21	employee was \$177,765."
22	Did I get that accurate?
23	A You read it. I have no idea how
24	that number was determined.
25	Q But I did read it correctly?
26	A You did.
27	Q Thank you. I know it's hard to
28	generalize about your 12,000 PG&E members,

but what proportion of those 12,000 members 1 2. do you think earns above the PG&E median and what proportion falls below the median? 3 The trouble with your question is 4 Α that this refers to total compensation. 5 6 That's a pretty tricky concept. In General 7 Rate Case proceedings, we've gone back and forth with the Division of Ratepayer 9 Advocates, Office of Ratepayer Advocates 10 about what is total compensation, what's 11 included, and what's not. 12 So, I really can't answer the 13 question without knowing how they calculated 14 the total compensation of 188,000. 15 Well, you must calculate it in some 16 fashion in your collective bargaining 17 strategy, do you not? We generally go -- with wages, we 18 19 certainly do. With benefits, we are aware of 2.0 the cost, but we are negotiating the value of 21 the benefit to the employee rather than the 22 cost, if that makes sense. It's sort of like a defined benefit 23 24 versus a defined contribution pension plan. 25 We have some sense of what the cost is, 26 although especially with the pension. I 27 mean, that moves around quite a bit. 2.8 Q But without trying to be too

2.8

specific, just in terms of order of 1 magnitude, would it be correct to assume that 2. 3 the majority of your members are most likely above the median level for the PG&E work 4 force? 5 6 No. That might be true, but I'm 7 not comfortable saying it's probably true. mean we -- a customer service representative 8 9 makes around \$80,000 a year in wage -- in 10 straight-time wages, and so for them to get 11 over that would have to be a hundred thousand dollars and other benefits and I don't think 12 that that's true. 13 14 I mean I could maybe try to figure 15 this out, but off the top of my head --16 certainly there are employees, there are 17 employees whose wages or their wage earnings, 18 including overtime alone, are above that, but 19 there's significant numbers that are below 2.0 that. 21 Thank you. Why did you find it 22 necessary to include in the IBEW agreement 2.3 attached to PG&E's Plan of Reorganization a 24 commitment to operate Diablo Canyon until its 25 license has expired? 26 MS. KOSS: Your Honor, objection, 27 outside the scope of the testimony.

ALJ ALLEN: Overruled.

2.8

that -- well...

THE WITNESS: 1 We were concerned about 2. any possible split-off or break-up of the company, whether it be a line of business 3 such as gas, a line of business such as 4 5 hydro, an asset such as Diablo Canyon, or municipalization. So, in that general 6 7 category of wanting the keep the company whole, we included it in our agreement. 9 Q But Diablo Canyon is the only plant 10 specified, is it not, in your agreement? 11 Α Yes. And why is that? 12 0 13 Α It's not the only one we have. 14 have a couple of little combined cycles that 15 don't have -- they don't have 10 percent of 16 the number of employees as Diablo Canyon and 17 there's very little chance of them being sold 18 off, Humboldt or the other two. 19 And would you say the same about 2.0 the hydro system? 21 There are segments of the hydro 22 system that we recognize are no longer 23 economically feasible, especially as 24 relicensing happens, Potter Valley being one, 25 an example that I heard a lot about yesterday 26 in Washington, DC, from Congressman Hough, 27 but to some extent with hydro. But I think

So in the hydro setting, you 1 0 2. recognize the possibility that economics may 3 cause the company to shut the plant? It's licensing concerns, yeah. 4 Α How do you envision the commitment 5 0 that you've successfully negotiated in the 6 7 IBEW agreement attached to PG&E's plan? do you envision that commitment being 9 enforced? 10 Α Are you talking about the wages and 11 the medical and the layoff, that entire 12 language? 13 No, I'm sorry. Let me be clear; 14 the commitment to operate Diablo Canyon until 15 the end of its licenses. 16 Well, I think that commitment is Α 17 there in the agreement that you are part of. 18 I think that upon emergence from bankruptcy, 19 assuming that the plan is confirmed, all of 2.0 our agreements would be reduced to a letter 21 agreement or a memorandum of understanding in 22 the context of collective bargaining and that's how it would be enforced. 2.3 24 Would that commitment still apply if PG&E lost so much bundled load that its 25 26 customers no longer had any use for most of 27 the electricity generated at Diablo Canyon? 2.8

MS. KOSS: Your Honor, objection, this

1	is far outside the scope.
2	ALJ ALLEN: Sustained.
3	BY MR. GEESMAN:
4	Q Under the commitment made by PG&E
5	and the IBEW agreement, would there be any
6	cap on the amount to be spent subsidizing any
7	above-market costs at Diablo Canyon?
8	MS. KOSS: Again, objection.
9	ALJ ALLEN: Sustained.
10	MR. GEESMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
11	That's all my questioning.
12	Thank you very much, Mr. Dalzell.
13	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Geesman.
14	THE WITNESS: I'm a little disappointed
15	because I thought you were going to get into
16	executive compensation and I was ready with
17	my Karl Marx and my Guilford Plantation
18	Covenant and the New Testament.
19	ALJ ALLEN: If we had more hearing
20	time.
21	THE WITNESS: I was ready.
22	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
23	Is there any redirect?
24	MS. KOSS: No, your Honor.
25	ALJ ALLEN: Okay. Thank you.
26	Thank you, Mr. Dalzell, you are
27	excused.
28	You had one exhibit for CUE;

1	correct?
2	MS. KOSS: Yes, thank you, your Honor.
3	CUE would like to move what has been marked
4	as Exhibit CUE-01 into the record.
5	ALJ ALLEN: Is there any objection to
6	receipt of Exhibit CUE-01? Seeing none,
7	CUE-01 is received.
8 9	(Exhibit No. CUE-01 was received into evidence.)
10	ALJ ALLEN: Let's go on the record with
11	some A4NR exhibits. So, A4NR-01, which has
12	been identified for the record, is the
13	Prepared Testimony of David Lochbaum.
14	A4NR-02 is the Reply Testimony of John
15	Geesman. I also have A4NR-02-C, which is a
16	confidential replacement of page 18 of
17	A4NR-02 that has also already been marked.
18	Off the record.
19	(Off the record.)
20	ALJ ALLEN: On the record. A4NR-02-E
21	is an errata to A4NR. That had not been
22	previously marked in the record. I'm
23	identifying Hearing Room Exhibit Errata
24	A4NR-02 as A4NR-02-E.
25	(Exhibit No. A4NR-02-E was marked
26	for identification.)
27	ALJ ALLEN: A4NR-X-03 is
28	Cross-Examination Exhibit Form 10K. That was

1	already identified for the record. A4NR-X-04
2	is Cross-Examination Exhibit Advice Letter
3	5700-E. That was previously identified for
4	the record.
5	A4NR-X-05 had not been previously
6	identified, so this is Cross-Examination
7	Exhibit A4NR Protest of Advice Letter 5700-E.
8	That will be A4NR-X-05.
9	(Exhibit No. A4NR-X-05 was marked
10	for identification.)
11	ALJ ALLEN: Cross-examination Exhibit
12	PG&E Reply to A4NR Protest of Advice Letter
13	5700-E will be identified as A4NR-X-06.
14	(Exhibit No. A4NR-X-06 was marked
15	for identification.)
16	ALJ ALLEN: Alliance for Nuclear
17	Responsibility Cross-Examination Exhibit PG&E
18	January 31, 2020, Safety Culture and
19	Governance Quarterly Report is being
20	identified as A4NR-X-07.
21	(Exhibit No. A4NR-X-07 was marked
22	for identification.)
23	ALJ ALLEN: The cross-examination
24	exhibit used today, 2019 Joint Proxy
25	Statement was identified as A4NR-X-08.
26	Did I get that correct, Mr. Geesman?
27	MR. GEESMAN: Yes, your Honor, you did.
28	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. And I take it

1	you are moving the admission of these
2	exhibits; is that correct?
3	MR. GEESMAN: Yes, I am.
4	ALJ ALLEN: Okay. Is there any
5	objection to receipt of the A4NR exhibits?
6	Seeing none, exhibits A4NR-01 through
7	A4NR-X-08 are admitted.
8	MR. GEESMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
9	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Geesman.
10	(Exhibit Nos. A4NR-01 through A4NR-X-08 were received into
11	evidence.)
12	ALJ ALLEN: Mr. Fox, will you be
13	presenting the next witness?
14	MR. FOX: Yes, I will, your Honor.
15	ALJ ALLEN: Go ahead and call your
16	witness, please.
17	MR. FOX: The Joint CCA parties call
18	Mr. Tom Beach.
19	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
20	R. THOMAS BEACH, called as a witness by the Joint CCAs, having been sworn,
21	testified as follows:
22	THE WITNESS: I do.
23	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. Please be
24	seated, state your full name and spell your
25	last name for the record.
26	THE WITNESS: My name is first initial
27	R. Thomas Beach, B-e-a-c-h.
28	///

1	DIRECT EXAMINATION
2	BY MR. FOX:
3	Q Mr. Beach, would you please state
4	your employer and position for the record.
5	A I am a principal consultant at
6	Crossborder Energy.
7	Q Mr. Beach, would you please state
8	on whose behalf you are testifying today.
9	A Yes. I am testifying on behalf of
10	the Joint Community Choice Aggregators. For
11	the purposes of this proceeding, there are
12	five of them listed on page two of my
13	testimony.
14	MR. FOX: Your Honor, I do want to
15	clarify that one of those parties is the City
16	of San Jose. The City of San Jose is
17	represented by Ms. Elkin from the San Jose
18	City Attorney's Office. Ms. Elkin has asked
19	me to handle the cross-examination and
20	redirect from Mr. Beach today.
21	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Fox.
22	BY MR. FOX:
23	Q Mr. Beach, do you have what has
24	been marked as JCCA-01 one?
25	A Yes.
26	Q Your prepared testimony?
27	A Yes.
28	Q Was it prepared by you or under

1	your supervision?
2	A Yes, it was.
3	Q Do you have any corrections that
4	you'd like to make to that testimony,
5	Mr. Beach?
6	A Yes. I have one correction.
7	Actually, maybe two corrections. On page 23
8	of the testimony, lines 12 through 15, there
9	is a section there that in my original
10	testimony was confidential. But I believe
11	PG&E has agreed that that information is no
12	longer confidential.
13	So the sentence there starting on
14	line 12 and ending on line 15, the words
15	"begin confidential" and "end confidential"
16	should be removed.
17	And then on line 14, on page 23, in
18	the one formally-confidential sentence, the
19	figure "\$163 million" should be revised
20	(Phone interruption.)
21	ALJ ALLEN: Hold on. Off the record.
22	(Off the record.)
23	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
24	THE WITNESS: Yes on line 14 of
25	page 23, the figure \$154 million excuse
26	me. \$163 million should be changed to \$154
27	million based on some updated information
28	from PG&E.

1	ALJ ALLEN: I am sorry. Could you
2	repeat that correction again?
3	THE WITNESS: Yes. The correction is
4	on line 14 of page 23. The testimony the
5	Figure \$163 million that appears on that line
6	should be changed to \$154 million.
7	BY MR. FOX:
8	Q And, Mr. Beach, with those
9	corrections if I was to ask you the same
10	questions that appear in the testimony, would
11	your answers be the same?
12	A Yes, they would.
13	Q Is your testimony true and correct
14	to the best of your knowledge?
15	A Yes.
16	MR. FOX: Your Honor, Mr. Beach is
17	available for cross-examination.
18	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
19	MR. ALCANTAR: Your Honor, before you
20	proceed, can I just get some clarification on
21	the correction just made by Mr. Beach?
22	The copy I have does not have is
23	blank; right? There's nothing there.
24	There's no sentences between "begin
25	confidential" and "end confidential." So you
26	substituted a number in the sentence I take
27	it?
28	THE WITNESS: Yes.

1	MR. ALCANTAR: Okay. Could you read
2	the sentence for us? Maybe that would help.
3	THE WITNESS: Sure. The sentence
4	reads:
5	In addition, PG&E's
6	confidential financial
7	projections for 2020 to
8	2024 appear to assume that
9	ratepayers will bare \$154
10	million in costs for the
11	exit financing required for
12	PG&E to emerge from
13	Chapter 11.
14	And then there was a footnote that
15	footnoted PG&E's financial package released
16	on February 14th at tab 11, rows 21 to 24.
17	MR. ALCANTAR: Thank you.
18	ALJ ALLEN: Mr. Fox, can you make sure
19	that you distribute to the parties or make
20	sure the parties have, who don't have, the
21	public version or confirm that they got it.
22	MR. FOX: They do. The public version
23	was served on the service list the morning of
24	February 26th, your Honor.
25	ALJ ALLEN: Like I said, the currently
26	public version which includes the sentence?
27	MR. FOX: That was served on the 24th
28	or the 26th to the service list.

1	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
2	Off the record.
3	(Off the record.)
4	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
5	First cross-examination will be by
6	Mr. Cragg.
7	CROSS-EXAMINATION
8	BY MR. CRAGG:
9	Q Thank you, your Honor.
10	I'm Bryan Cragg representing the
11	Independent Energy Producers Association. At
12	this point, I would ask for the
13	identification of a three page exhibit
14	entitled Joint Community Choice Aggregators
15	February 28th, 2020, Responses to the First
16	set of data requests from the Independent
17	Energy Producers Association.
18	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Cragg.
19	That is marked as IEP-01.
20	(Exhibit No. IEP-01 was marked for identification.)
21	146116111164616111,
22	MR. CRAGG: I'd also ask for the
23	admission of Exhibit IEP-01 at this point.
24	ALJ ALLEN: Why don't you do your cross
25	first. Then you can move it.
26	MR. CRAGG: Okay, your Honor. Unless
27	there is testimony that is inconsistent with
28	the contents of Exhibit IEP-01, I have no

1	cross-examination for Mr. Beach.
2	ALJ ALLEN: Run that by me one more
3	time.
4	MR. CRAGG: As long as the testimony
5	elicited in cross-examination is consistent
6	with the testimony of the answers that
7	Mr. Beach provided in Exhibit IEP-01, I have
8	no additional cross-examination.
9	In other words, I expect to have no
10	cross unless somehow inconsistent information
11	comes up in cross-examination.
12	ALJ ALLEN: Maybe I should have had you
13	go last.
14	(Laughter.)
15	MR. CRAGG: I'm happy to do that as
15 16	MR. CRAGG: I'm happy to do that as well, your Honor.
16	well, your Honor.
16 17	well, your Honor. ALJ ALLEN: Well, let me ask you this.
16 17 18	well, your Honor. ALJ ALLEN: Well, let me ask you this. Mr. Beach, have you had a chance to look at
16 17 18 19	well, your Honor. ALJ ALLEN: Well, let me ask you this. Mr. Beach, have you had a chance to look at IEP-01?
16 17 18 19 20	well, your Honor. ALJ ALLEN: Well, let me ask you this. Mr. Beach, have you had a chance to look at IEP-01? THE WITNESS: Yeah. I prepared it.
16 17 18 19 20 21	well, your Honor. ALJ ALLEN: Well, let me ask you this. Mr. Beach, have you had a chance to look at IEP-01? THE WITNESS: Yeah. I prepared it. ALJ ALLEN: Do you anticipate answering
16 17 18 19 20 21	well, your Honor. ALJ ALLEN: Well, let me ask you this. Mr. Beach, have you had a chance to look at IEP-01? THE WITNESS: Yeah. I prepared it. ALJ ALLEN: Do you anticipate answering any questions differently than what is
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	well, your Honor. ALJ ALLEN: Well, let me ask you this. Mr. Beach, have you had a chance to look at IEP-01? THE WITNESS: Yeah. I prepared it. ALJ ALLEN: Do you anticipate answering any questions differently than what is contained in IEP-01?
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	well, your Honor. ALJ ALLEN: Well, let me ask you this. Mr. Beach, have you had a chance to look at IEP-01? THE WITNESS: Yeah. I prepared it. ALJ ALLEN: Do you anticipate answering any questions differently than what is contained in IEP-01? THE WITNESS: Not at this time.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	well, your Honor. ALJ ALLEN: Well, let me ask you this. Mr. Beach, have you had a chance to look at IEP-01? THE WITNESS: Yeah. I prepared it. ALJ ALLEN: Do you anticipate answering any questions differently than what is contained in IEP-01? THE WITNESS: Not at this time. ALJ ALLEN: Is there any objection to

1	admitted.
2	(Exhibit No. IEP-01 was received
3	into evidence.)
4	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Cragg.
5	MR. CRAGG: Thank you, your Honor.
6	ALJ ALLEN: I appreciate the very
7	concise cross-examination.
8	Mr. Weissmann?
9	CROSS-EXAMINATION
10	BY MR. WEISSMANN:
11	Q Thank you, your Honor.
12	Good morning. My name is Henry
13	Weissmann. I'm one of the lawyers
14	representing PG&E in this proceeding.
15	A Good morning.
16	Q Please turn to your testimony page
17	18, lines 16 to 18.
18	A Okay.
19	Q So here you recommend that the
20	Commission should condition approval on the
21	adoption of a goal of a majority residing in
22	the service territory; right?
23	A Yes.
24	Q By using the world "goal," you're
25	not suggesting that would be a strict quota;
26	correct?
27	A I didn't propose, you know, for
28	example, a specific number of Board members

1	that should resign. That should be and a
2	goal also means that it could be accomplished
3	over a period of time.
4	Q So okay. So the process of
5	assembling a Board requires consideration of
6	a number of different skills; correct?
7	A Yes.
8	Q And you need to make sure that the
9	Board has the right mix of those skills?
10	A Sure.
11	Q Have you reviewed Ms. Brownell's
12	testimony?
13	A Yes. I did read that.
14	Q So if you'll take a look, please,
15	at Tab 5 in the binder. This is what's been
16	previously marked for identification as
17	PG&E-01. And I'll ask you to turn to pages
18	4-11 and 4-12.
19	A Okay.
20	Q So here in the bullet points
21	starting on 4-11, line 14, Ms. Brownell sets
22	forth a number of attributes that PG&E
23	intends to use in composing this Board;
24	correct?
25	A Yes.
26	Q Do you agree that these are
~ =	
27	important attributes for PG&E to consider?

Do you agree that a strict 1 0 2. inflexible requirement of 50 percent of residents in the service territory could 3 conflict with the need to balance the range of skills needed? 5 I think that given the service 6 Α 7 territory that PG&E serves which is large, diverse, and is if you will one of the 9 business and intellectual capitols of the 10 United States with lots of talented people, I 11 would hope that PG&E could find individuals 12 who have relevant expertise who reside in its 13 service territory. 14 Well, I certainly share your hope. 15 But my question was: Is there a possibility 16 that limiting it to that geography could 17 conflict with the objective of obtaining a 18 Board with this mix of skills? 19 I would doubt that that would be a 2.0 limiting factor. 21 Well, let me ask. First of all, 22 have you conducted a search for directors? 2.3 Α Not for a utility, no. 24 O Let me give you a hypothetical. 25 Let's say that PG&E assembled a Board and had 26 45 -- it selected Board members 45 percent of 27 which were residents of a service territory, 2.8 and they had one final spot to fill to

compose the full slate. And there are two 1 candidates. One who has wildfire 2. 3 preparedness and education expertise who lives in the State of Washington. And one 5 who has business and technology expertise and 6 lives in Silicon Valley. What should happen? 7 Α You know, it's kind of -- your hypothetical I don't know who the -- what the 8 9 skills of the remaining Board members are. 10 So if there are other people on the Board with wildfire skills, then I would say 11 12 for sure you should take the local resident 13 who's got business and technology background. 14 And if not? 0 15 You know, I think that that would 16 be -- you know, this is, as I put down here, 45 percent residing in PG&E's territory would 17 18 be a significant improvement over the 19 situation today. So PG&E certainly could --2.0 would be making progress towards its goal under these circumstances. 21 22 0 Let's turn to page 18 of your 2.3 testimony, please. 24 Α Okay. I'm there. 25 You cite CalPERS here; right? 0 26 Α Yes. 27 Are and CalPERS says that Board members should become and remain 2.8

1	independently familiar with company
2	operations; right?
3	A Yes.
4	Q And your assertion is that the most
5	effective way to obtain independent
6	information is to be a resident of a service
7	territory?
8	A Well, I think it's very helpful if
9	you are a resident and a customer, and you
10	have friends and neighbors and associates who
11	are also customers of PG&E. It would give
12	you a source of readily available source
13	of independent information about the company.
14	Q About certain things about the
15	company?
16	A Yes.
17	Q But there are other ways that Board
18	members can become independently familiar
19	with the company's operations; correct?
20	A Sure.
21	Q Okay. I'm going to turn to another
22	subject. Please turn to page 25 starting at
23	line 24.
24	A Okay.
25	Q So here you say:
26	The Commission cannot make
27	the necessary determination
28	that the plan is neutral on

average unless it answers
neutral compared to what.
Correct?
A Yes.
Q Then you state quote:
The comparison that must be
made is to what ratepayers
would have paid without the
bankruptcy.
End quote; correct?
A Yes.
Q So in your opinion in future cost
of capital proceedings, the Commission would
have to compare PG&E's actual financing costs
to that hypothetical baseline; correct?
A Yes.
Q So the Commission would have to
look at the costs ratepayers would pay
compared to the costs they would have paid in
a hypothetical world in which there was no
bankruptcy; correct?
A Yes.
Q So how would the Commission
determine the costs that PG&E ratepayers
would pay in that hypothetical world?
A Well, you can certainly look at
what PG&E paid before the bankruptcy. You
can look at what other California utilities'

cost of capital is. Utilities that face the 1 2. same regulatory and statutory structures as PG&E and operate in the same state with 3 similar wildfire risks. 4 You can look at what their cost of 5 6 capital -- the trajectory of that over time. And from that information, you can construct 7 the counter factual, if you will, baseline 9 for what PG&E's cost of capital would have 10 been absent the bankruptcy. 11 0 Have you quantified the cost that 12 PG&E ratepayers would have paid in a world 13 without bankruptcy? 14 Α Not for this testimony, no. recommend that it be done in the cost of 15 16 capital update proceeding that the Commission is planning to conduct. That would certainly 17 18 be a much more appropriate proceeding to 19 gather that kind of detailed information. 2.0 Okay. So you as you sit here 21 today, you don't have any opinion as to what 22 the cost of capital would have been in the 2.3 absence of the bankruptcy; correct? 24 Α Not on a quantitative basis, no. 25 0 Did you hear Ms. Meal's testimony 26 yesterday? 27 Α I did not. I read her testimony.

I read her written testimony.

2.8

But you didn't hear her testify 1 0 2. live yesterday? No, I didn't. 3 Α Okay. I'll represent to you that 4 0 she testified that for the Commission to 5 6 determine what PG&E's cost of capital would 7 have been had it not declared bankruptcy would be highly speculative. Do you agree 8 with that? 9 10 Д I don't agree with that. 11 0 PG&E's currently authorized cost of debt is lower than it would have been absent 12 13 the bankruptcy; correct? 14 Α No. I think that's one of the 15 things that would need to be determined in 16 the cost of capital update proceeding is whether -- what -- what is the relationship 17 18 between PG&E's current cost of debt and what 19 it would have been absent the bankruptcy. 2.0 PG&E's current authorized cost of debt is 5.16; right? 21 22 Α Their currently authorized cost of debt? 2.3 24 O Yes. It's -- I believe that that number 25 А 26 -- if that number is from the most recent 27 cost of capital decision, then I don't 2.8 remember the decimal points on that.

that sounds about right. 1 Would PG&E's authorized cost of 2. 3 debt -- sorry. And that 5.16 is based on the cost 4 of debtor in possession financing; right? 5 I don't know how that was 6 Α 7 developed. I haven't looked at the record of that case. 8 9 Is it your opinion that PG&E's authorized cost of debt would be lower than 10 11 5.16 had it not filed for bankruptcy in January of 2019? 12 13 It could have been. Α 14 Well, if PG&E had not filed for 15 bankruptcy, it could not have gotten debtor 16 in possession financing; right? It wouldn't have needed debtor in 17 Α 18 possession financing by definition. 19 It would have to borrow those funds 2.0 without debtor in possession financing? 21 Α Right. It would have presumably 22 undertaken ordinary utility financing the way it does in the normal course of business. 2.3 24 And without -- and normal O Right. 25 course financing for PG&E in January 2019 26 would have been higher than the cost of the 27 debtor in possession financing; correct? I don't know that. 2.8 Α

1	Q Do you have an understanding of
2	debtor in possession financing works?
3	A Not in any depth, no.
4	Q Do you understand that it's a first
5	priority link?
6	A Yes. I think that's true.
7	Q So logically would not a first
8	priority link be cheaper than a borrowing
9	A Again, I'm not an expert in
10	financing bankruptcy.
11	ALJ ALLEN: Let's make sure that we
12	have just one person speaking. So make sure
13	the question's complete before you give your
14	answer.
15	BY MR. WEISSMANN:
15 16	BY MR. WEISSMANN: Q I'll direct your attention to
16	Q I'll direct your attention to
16 17	Q I'll direct your attention to what's been marked for identification as
16 17 18	Q I'll direct your attention to what's been marked for identification as PG&E-X-07, which is the Joint CCA response to
16 17 18 19	Q I'll direct your attention to what's been marked for identification as PG&E-X-07, which is the Joint CCA response to our data request. It's Tab 2 in your binder.
16 17 18 19 20	Q I'll direct your attention to what's been marked for identification as PG&E-X-07, which is the Joint CCA response to our data request. It's Tab 2 in your binder. So first let's just establish a
16 17 18 19 20 21	Q I'll direct your attention to what's been marked for identification as PG&E-X-07, which is the Joint CCA response to our data request. It's Tab 2 in your binder. So first let's just establish a foundation. Are you familiar with this
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q I'll direct your attention to what's been marked for identification as PG&E-X-07, which is the Joint CCA response to our data request. It's Tab 2 in your binder. So first let's just establish a foundation. Are you familiar with this document?
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q I'll direct your attention to what's been marked for identification as PG&E-X-07, which is the Joint CCA response to our data request. It's Tab 2 in your binder. So first let's just establish a foundation. Are you familiar with this document? A Yes.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Q I'll direct your attention to what's been marked for identification as PG&E-X-07, which is the Joint CCA response to our data request. It's Tab 2 in your binder. So first let's just establish a foundation. Are you familiar with this document? A Yes. Q Were you involved in its
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Q I'll direct your attention to what's been marked for identification as PG&E-X-07, which is the Joint CCA response to our data request. It's Tab 2 in your binder. So first let's just establish a foundation. Are you familiar with this document? A Yes. Q Were you involved in its preparation?

1	A Yes.
2	ALJ ALLEN: I'm not sure that's
3	actually been identified on the record yet.
4	MR. WEISSMANN: I'm sorry, your Honor.
5	ALJ ALLEN: So this is PG&E Hearing
6	Room Exhibit JCCA Response to PG&E Data
7	Request No. 001 and Review of the Debt
8	Savings For PG&E Plan XLSX is identified as
9	PG&E-X-07.
10	(Exhibit No. PG&E-X-07 was marked for identification.)
11	ror identification.
12	BY MR. WEISSMANN:
13	Q So looking at the response to
14	Question 2.
15	A Yes.
16	Q And here you say:
17	PG&E's overall cost of debt
18	upon emergence may be
19	somewhat lower than PG&E's
20	overall cost of debt before
21	PG&E filed for bankruptcy
22	due in part to the interest
23	rate savings that PG&E has
24	negotiated as part of its
25	plan. And in part to
26	interest rate changes over
27	time in the normal course
28	of business that are not

1	related to the plan or to
2	the bankruptcy.
3	Do you see that?
4	A Yes.
5	Q And the interest rate savings that
6	PG&E has negotiated as part of its plan, that
7	refers to the note holder RSA?
8	A Yes.
9	Q And in that agreement, PG&E was
10	able to refinance prepetition high coupon
11	debt at lower interest rates; right?
12	A That's my understanding.
13	Q And PG&E could not have done that
14	absent the bankruptcy; correct?
15	A Yes. I'll agree that that was the
16	result of the bankruptcy.
17	Q So the direct rate impact is
18	withdrawn.
19	The direct rate impacts of the plan
20	are those that would result from the cost of
21	capital update that would follow emergence;
22	correct?
23	A Well, that's where the first time
24	that those savings would be incorporated into
25	the rates.
26	Q And that would result in a rate
27	reduction?
28	A Yes.

1	Q Okay. Please take a look at what's
2	been previously marked for identification as
3	PG&E-11, which is Tab 8 of your binder. And
4	this is a PG&E data response to a request
5	from TURN. And directing your attention to
6	the third page of that document, which has a
7	table. Let me know when you're there.
8	A I'm there.
9	Q So this reflects PG&E's calculation
10	of the estimated 2021 revenue requirement
11	savings resulting from the plan; right?
12	A Yes.
13	Q And do you have any reason to
14	disagree with this estimated revenue
15	requirement savings?
16	A Well I think as I I was asked
17	this in the data response that we just
18	referenced. And, no. I haven't had a chance
19	to verify the source and accuracy of all
20	these numbers.
21	But assuming that they're I have
22	no reason sitting here to believe they're
23	incorrect.
24	Q So this spreadsheet show a 4.3
25	percent post-emergent cost of debt; right?
26	A Yes.
27	Q And that factors in the
28	amortization of the debt financing related

1	fees that PG&E's seeking to recover; right?
2	A Yes.
3	Q And if I understood your well,
4	let me just ask you. Do you have an opinion
5	as to whether PG&E's cost of debt would be
6	lower than 4.31 had it not filed for
7	bankruptcy?
8	A Well, I think it's my
9	recommendation that's what the Commission
10	should take a look at.
11	Q Right. You don't have an opinion
12	one way or the other?
13	A I don't have sitting here I
14	don't.
15	Q I think you said before if I wrote
16	it down correctly that in determining the
17	baseline, the Commission should consider the
18	cost of debt of other California utilities;
19	correct?
20	A Yes.
21	Q And if you look at your testimony
22	page 26, lines 8 through 12, are you there?
23	A Yeah.
24	Q So here you say that. You say
25	that:
26	
	The baseline should
27	The baseline should consider the financing cost

1	utilities.
2	Right?
3	A Yes.
4	Q So SCE's cost of debt for 2020 is
5	4.74 percent; correct?
6	A Again, I have to look at the cost
7	of capital decision.
8	Q Okay. Take my word for it. And
9	A If that's where you got it from, I
10	subject to check.
11	Q Take my word for it per Decision
12	19-12-056, which we'll cite in the brief.
13	SCE's cost of debt for 2020 is 4.74 percent?
14	A Well, that's what it was estimated
15	to be in at the time of that cost of
15 16	to be in at the time of that cost of capital case.
16	capital case.
16 17	capital case. Q It's the authorized amount.
16 17 18	capital case. Q It's the authorized amount. A Yes.
16 17 18 19	capital case. Q It's the authorized amount. A Yes. Q And SDG&E's authorized cost of debt
16 17 18 19 20	capital case. Q It's the authorized amount. A Yes. Q And SDG&E's authorized cost of debt for 2020 is 4.59 percent.
16 17 18 19 20 21	capital case. Q It's the authorized amount. A Yes. Q And SDG&E's authorized cost of debt for 2020 is 4.59 percent. A Again, subject to check.
16 17 18 19 20 21	capital case. Q It's the authorized amount. A Yes. Q And SDG&E's authorized cost of debt for 2020 is 4.59 percent. A Again, subject to check. Q So and we just established that
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	capital case. Q It's the authorized amount. A Yes. Q And SDG&E's authorized cost of debt for 2020 is 4.59 percent. A Again, subject to check. Q So and we just established that PG&E's anticipated cost of debt on exit is
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	capital case. Q It's the authorized amount. A Yes. Q And SDG&E's authorized cost of debt for 2020 is 4.59 percent. A Again, subject to check. Q So and we just established that PG&E's anticipated cost of debt on exit is 4.3 percent; correct?
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	capital case. Q It's the authorized amount. A Yes. Q And SDG&E's authorized cost of debt for 2020 is 4.59 percent. A Again, subject to check. Q So and we just established that PG&E's anticipated cost of debt on exit is 4.3 percent; correct? A Yes.

2.8

Α

Yes.

Well, that -- again, you know, that 1 Α 2. was a -- the San Diego and Edison cost of debt were figures that were estimated some 3 time ago. And you're comparing that to a 4 PG&E cost of debt that was estimated very 5 recently. 6 So, you know, that's something you 7 would have to look at in the cost of capital 8 9 proceeding. I'm not going to agree that 10 those are -- that's an apples to apples 11 comparison. It may be an apples and oranges 12 comparison. Because the Edison and San Diego 13 14 numbers may have been estimated several years 15 And their actual cost of debt today, 16 because of lower interest rates, may be 17 something lower than that. 18 Okav. This was Decision -- this 0 19 decision was issued in December of '19. 2.0 Yes. But the cases were filed Α 21 quite a bit before that, and the information 22 was prepared even earlier. 2.3 Let's say that -- let me step back. Q 24 You're suggesting that there be 25 this baseline established and then the 26 Commission will compare PG&E's actual cost of 27 debt to that baseline; correct?

2.8

Q

And then make some adjustment of 1 0 2 some kind if there's a deviation from the baseline? 3 Α Well, my recommendation would be 4 that the cost of capital for rates would be 5 set based on the baseline. 6 7 Okay. So if PG&E's actual cost of debt is below the baseline, would PG&E recover the baseline? 9 10 Α Well, again, this is for the --11 this is what the Commission needs to have a proceeding for. If it turns out by some --12 13 PG&E can show that its cost of capital is 14 actually lower than it would have been 15 without the bankruptcy, then I would assume 16 the Commission would say, "Okay. You've met 17 the rate neutrality provision, and we'll go 18 forward based on your actual cost of 19 capital." 2.0 0 So it's a one-way ratchet? 21 Α Because that's certainly the 22 way I interpret AB 1054. Is it has to be --2.3 you have to achieve neutrality. Once you achieved neutrality, then you satisfied the 24 -- you know, that provision -- that portion 25 26 of the statute. And you can move forward on 27 a business as usual basis.

So once PG&E's cost of debt is

below the baseline, then this comparison 1 2. ends? Well, the Commission -- once the 3 Commission has found that PG&E's cost are 4 5 neutral on average, and the Commission has to 6 determine what on average means and over what 7 time period. Once that has been satisfied, then you've meet the conditions per the 9 statute. 10 0 Yeah. I'm asking you what the end 11 date is for your proposal. 12 Α Well, I don't know what the end The Commission needs to sit down 13 date is. 14 and set a baseline and see where we are. 15 Q Right. But my question is does the 16 proposal that you're setting forth end when 17 PG&E's cost of debt is at or below the 18 baseline? 19 Well, that would certainly be a 2.0 time for the Commission to -- in other words, if PG&E's costs have been above the 21 22 baseline -- if the -- if rates have been set 2.3 at the baseline and after several years PG&E's costs fall below the baseline, then 24 25 that would probably be the right time to end 26 the mechanism. 27 And what if PG&E's costs are below the baseline on exit? 2.8

Well, that's what we need to figure 1 Α 2. out. I understand we need to figure out 3 0 whether that's the case. My question is if 4 PG&E's costs were below the baseline on exit, 5 would that mean that your recommendation 6 7 would not apply? MR. FOX: Your Honor, objection, I 8 believe this has been asked and answered. 9 10 ALJ ALLEN: Overruled for now, but 11 let's not go too much more on this. I think that would be --12 THE WITNESS: that would be for the Commission to determine 13 14 if the rate neutrality on average condition of AB-1054 had been satisfied. 15 16 BY MR. WEISSMANN: 17 0 Please turn to page 24, lines 13 18 to 17. 19 Α Okay. 2.0 0 Here you posit higher financing 21 costs; correct? 22 Α Yes. 2.3 But you've not quantified those 24 higher financing costs; correct? 25 I'm positing them because А No. PG&E's witnesses seem to suggest that there 26 27 will be a path to improving its credit 2.8 ratings. While you're on that path, it would

1	stand to reason that you will have higher
2	financing cost.
3	Q And there are many factors that
4	contribute to those higher financing costs;
5	correct?
6	A Yeah, I would agree that there are
7	a number of factors that contribute to what a
8	utility's financing costs are.
9	Q Like wildfire risk exposure in the
10	future?
11	A Yes. But, you know, these
12	factors that that is a risk that's faced
13	by all of California utilities.
14	Q Correct. So it's not the result of
15	the bankruptcy; right?
16	A Generally I would agree that so
17	long as it's a risk that's also faced by
18	Edison and San Diego, that it would not be
19	due to the bankruptcy.
20	Q Right. And another risk is rating
21	agency's perception of the California
22	regulatory environment; right?
23	A Sure. That is a factor, yes.
24	Q Including its being fair and
25	balanced; correct?
26	A Yes.
27	Q And not have one-way ratchets;
28	correct?

Α I'm not sure I would agree one-way 1 2 ratchets are unfair. So do you have a methodology for 3 Q separating the potential impacts of the 4 bankruptcy versus other factors? 5 Well, that's why I suggest 6 7 comparing bringing in information on the financing costs for Edison and San Diego 8 9 because those utilities are subject to, as we 10 just discussed, many of these same 11 considerations. Please turn back to the data 12 Okav. 13 responses which have been marked PG&E-X-07, 14 Tab 2 in your binder. Take a look at Ouestion and Answer 8. 15 16 Α Okay. 17 Here you recommend a baseline that 18 should start with PG&E's cost of capital in 19 this 24-month period from November '16 to 2.0 October '18; correct? 21 Α Yes. 22 Where did this period come from? 2.3 How did you invent that period? 24 Α I was asked in these data responses 25 what the pre-petition -- about how to establish this baseline and, you know, to 26 27 consider what PG&E's financial situation was 2.8 before Chapter 11. You need to look at it

over a certain period of time. It seemed to 1 2. me that those two years were a reasonable period of time to assess PG&E's financial 3 condition before bankruptcy. 4 5 When did you extend it to January 28, 2019, the day before PG&E filed 6 7 for bankruptcy? Α It seemed to me that sort of the 8 9 precipitating factor in PG&E's bankruptcy was 10 the Camp Fire so that I chose the two years 11 prior to that incident. 12 Okay. So actually the baseline is a world in which there was no Camp Fire? 13 14 Α Yes. 15 So it's not the bankruptcy. It's 16 the bankruptcy plus the Camp Fire is the 17 baseline? 18 А Well, I think that there's 19 certainly a pretty -- seems to me to be a 2.0 pretty close connection between the two. I 21 don't think PG&E would be bankrupt today 22 without the Camp Fire. 2.3 Okay. Well, what about the 2017 Q 24 fires? Are you excluding those? 25 They're part of this period No. 26 because PG&E did not declare bankruptcy after 27 those fires. But if the '17 fires had not 2.8

occurred and the Camp Fire did occur, would 1 PG&E have filed? No way to answer that 2. 3 question; right? Yeah, there's no way to answer 4 5 that. That's not what happened. 6 But your methodology is Camp in; 7 '17 out? Well, again, it certainly -- yeah, 8 Α 9 it's my opinion that the Camp Fire was the 10 precipitating factor. 11 What's that based on? What's your opinion based on? 12 Well, the Camp Fire happened in 13 Α 14 November of 2018 and PG&E declared bankruptcy 15 a couple months later. 16 You have the chronology correct, 17 but you're attributing the filing -- you're 18 saying the precipitating factor is the Camp 19 I'm asking what's your basis? 2.0 Well, I think it was PG&E's 21 liabilities after the Camp Fire that caused 22 it -- from the Camp Fire that caused it to 2.3 file for bankruptcy. 24 So let's just get some facts clear. 25 The rating agencies downgraded PG&E to 26 subinvestment grade on January 10, 2019; 27 correct? 2.8 I accept that subject to check. Α

1	Q That was before it filed for
2	bankruptcy; right?
3	A Yes.
4	Q So had PG&E not filed for
5	bankruptcy, any borrowings after it was
6	subinvestment grade would have reflected that
7	rating?
8	A Sure, presumably, yeah.
9	Q Okay. So let's look at your
10	24-month period. So PG&E had different
11	credit ratings throughout this period;
12	correct?
13	A Yes.
14	Q So for the starting point, are you
15	using an average of the costs over that
16	period or a point in time? How are we to
17	understand the starting point?
18	A Yes. I would generally think that
19	you would use the average over that period.
20	Q So the average implies that you're
21	not taking you're not permitting the cost
22	of capital baseline to reflect the full
23	effects of the 2017 fires; right?
24	A Well, they reflect, you know, since
25	the period includes the 2017 fires.
26	Q Right.
27	A So it does it reflects time both
28	before and after those fires.

1	Q Right. So the average does not
2	fully reflect the effects of the fires?
3	A I suppose if you had wanted to do
4	that, you'd just take a one-year period after
5	the 2017 fires.
6	Q Yeah, the lowest point. But you're
7	doing that?
8	A I'm not doing that, right.
9	Q Yeah. So let's continue with your
10	response to the data request. Question and
11	Answer 8. I am in PG&E-X-07. You're saying
12	the baseline should be adjusted so sorry,
13	step back.
14	We're starting out with an average
15	over this time period. And then the next
16	thing that you say is adjust that baseline
17	for debt inequity PG&E would have raised
18	after November 18th had it not been in
19	Chapter 11 based on its credit ratings during
20	the pre-petition baseline period.
21	That's the average; right?
22	A Yes.
23	Q And adjust it for interest rate
24	changes over time; right?
25	A Yes.
26	Q So when you begin the sentence "The
27	baseline should be adjusted," are you saying
28	it should be adjusted in terms of the quantum

of debt or the cost of the debt? 1 2. Α You'd probably consider both. So you're asking the Commission to 3 Q determine the debt inequity PG&E would have 4 5 raised had it not been in bankruptcy, how 6 much, and how much it would have cost? 7 Α Generally, yes. And you're asking the Commission to 9 assume that PG&E had the average credit 10 rating for the period when determining what 11 it would have done after October '18 absent 12 the bankruptcy? Generally, yes. And, again, you 13 Α 14 can bring in information about what was going 15 on with the other utilities during this 16 period would be useful in establishing that 17 baseline as well. 18 Let's talk about that next. So 19 that continuing with your response, you say: 2.0 In establishing the 21 baseline, the Commission 22 should also consider the 2.3 cost of capital both for 24 the 24-month period and 25 after November '19 for the 26 Edison and San Diego. 27 Right? 2.8 А Yes.

So when you say the Commission 1 0 2 should consider Edison and San Diego's cost of capital, what does it mean to consider? 3 Well, again, I think you're trying 4 to read a mathematical formula into testimony 5 that is not proposing a mathematical formula. 6 7 I'm simply proposing the type of information that the Commission should look at in the 9 cost of capital update proceeding in order to establish this baseline. 10 11 0 Now - -12 The Commission considers such Α information as it sees fit. 13 14 Yeah. I'm just seeking your 15 opinions, sir. You don't have a specific 16 recommendation about how they should consider 17 in your testimony today? 18 Α No, I don't. 19 You would acknowledge that 2.0 decreases in credit rating not attributable 21 to the bankruptcy are part of the baseline; 22 right? 2.3 Α Yeah. If there are other things going on that affect credit ratings that 24 25 should be considered in establishing the baseline, that would be fine. 26 27 Edison and San Diego's credit 2.8 ratings went down during this time frame;

1	correct?
2	A I don't know that. I haven't
3	reviewed their credit ratings.
4	Q So let me ask you to accept that
5	Edison had a credit rating one notch higher
6	than PG&E during the proposed baseline
7	period.
8	A Subject to check, I'll accept that.
9	Q So would that mean that in
10	conducting this analysis that you're
11	proposing, we would expect PG&E's baseline to
12	be a credit rating one notch below Edison?
13	A Again, that would certainly be one
14	way to do it. I'm not presenting a detailed
15	recommendation here. The intent here was to
16	broadly outline how this process would work
17	and the kind of information that the
18	Commission could look at.
19	Q All right. The same exhibit, page
20	four, Question 9. Here you make reference to
21	a chart or figure from Ms. Meal's testimony;
22	correct?
23	A Yes.
24	Q So are you saying that the baseline
25	should be BBB+?
26	A Well, that was the average of
27	PG&E's credit rating over those 24 months.
28	Q Right. That's not my question.

1	A But it sounded like it was your
2	question.
3	Q My question was in your submission,
4	is it your opinion that the baseline should
5	be set at BBB+?
6	A Again, that's my recommendation for
7	a baseline period. Over that period PG&E's
8	average credit rating was BBB+. So that
9	certainly would be probably where I would
10	start.
11	Q Right. And then there's
12	adjustments after that?
13	A That's right.
14	Q Including decreases that the other
15	utilities in California experienced?
16	A Possibly, yes.
17	Q You're not aware that PG&E that
18	other utilities
19	A Again, I no, I'm not aware of
20	what the trajectory of their credit rating
21	has been.
22	MR. FOX: Your Honor, I have to object
23	to this line of questioning. I believe that
24	Mr. Beach has testified that he is not
25	offering a specific proposal for how to
26	calculate this in this proceeding, that he
27	has merely proposed a way to go about a
28	procedural mechanism that the Commission can

use to establish a baseline. 1 ALJ ALLEN: I think we have some 2. clarity as to where we are on here, so if 3 you'd move on to the next thing. 4 5 MR. WEISSMANN: I'm moving on, yes. 6 Given the lack of specificity 7 around your proposal, this sounds fairly uncertain about how the Commission would 8 9 implement it; correct? 10 ALJ ALLEN: I think the parties will 11 stipulate that there's often uncertainty as to how the Commission will consider things. 12 13 BY MR. WEISSMANN: 14 And creating more uncertainty 15 around the Commission's ratemaking is not a 16 positive for the rating agency's perception 17 of the regulatory environment; correct? 18 Well, you know, it is what it is. Α 19 This is a case where the Commission has --2.0 the Commission had a statute that it has to 21 satisfy. I simply do not see that you can 22 satisfy that condition of ratepayer 2.3 neutrality on average without doing a counter 24 factual, but-for comparison. 25 PG&E's witnesses in their testimony say the same thing, so I think that's what 26 27 needs to be done to satisfy the statute. 2.8 Turn to page 23 of your testimony, Q

1	please.
2	A Okay.
3	Q Here you're talking about PG&E's
4	interest costs savings calculation; right?
5	A Yes.
6	Q You note that PG&E's calculation is
7	that the present value of the interest cost
8	savings is approximately \$1 billion; right?
9	A Yes.
10	Q And you calculate it at a lower
11	amount; correct?
12	A Yes.
13	Q And you provided us a spread sheet
14	that set forth your calculation?
15	A Yes.
16	Q So directing your attention to that
-	
17	spread sheet, which is, I believe, part of
	spread sheet, which is, I believe, part of PG&E-X-07, which is Tab 2 of your binder.
17	
17 18	PG&E-X-07, which is Tab 2 of your binder.
17 18 19	PG&E-X-07, which is Tab 2 of your binder. It's at the back.
17 18 19 20	PG&E-X-07, which is Tab 2 of your binder. It's at the back. A Okay.
17 18 19 20 21	PG&E-X-07, which is Tab 2 of your binder. It's at the back. A Okay. Q You prepared this spread sheet;
17 18 19 20 21 22	PG&E-X-07, which is Tab 2 of your binder. It's at the back. A Okay. Q You prepared this spread sheet; right?
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	PG&E-X-07, which is Tab 2 of your binder. It's at the back. A Okay. Q You prepared this spread sheet; right? A Well, it was prepared under my
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	PG&E-X-07, which is Tab 2 of your binder. It's at the back. A Okay. Q You prepared this spread sheet; right? A Well, it was prepared under my direction.
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	PG&E-X-07, which is Tab 2 of your binder. It's at the back. A Okay. Q You prepared this spread sheet; right? A Well, it was prepared under my direction. Q Do you adopt it as your testimony?

1	correct?
2	A Yes.
3	Q That's the 943. And then your
4	responsive one is one over to the left, which
5	is labeled "Savings/Cost"; correct?
6	A Yes.
7	Q And that's 796?
8	A Yes.
9	Q To do this calculation, you did the
10	present value of the interest and principal;
11	correct?
12	A Yes.
13	Q Going back to page two of Exhibit
14	PG&E-X-07, response to Question 5.
15	A Okay.
16	Q Here you talk about various
17	discount rates, 10.25 and 7.81; right?
18	A Yes.
19	Q In your opinion, are 7.81 and 10.25
20	standard discount rates used in ratemaking
21	analysis?
22	A Yes.
23	Q Okay. Just taking a step back, all
24	of these various calculations show interest
25	cost savings resulting from the plan;
26	correct?
27	A Yes.
28	MR. WEISSMANN: That's all I have, your

1	Honor.
2	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Weissmann.
3	Off the record.
4	(Off the record.)
5	ALJ ALLEN: On the record. We will
6	take a recess until 10:30 by the wall clock.
7	(Off the record.)
8	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
9	Ms. Koss.
10	MS. KOSS: Thank you.
11	CROSS-EXAMINATION
12	BY MS. KOSS:
13	Q Good morning, Mr. Beach.
14	A Good morning.
15	Q My name is Rachel Koss. I'm here
16	on behalf of Coalition of California Utility
17	Employees. It's nice to see you again.
18	A Nice to see you.
19	Q In your testimony, you recommend
20	that PG&E phase out its electric generation
21	service and associated procurement by 2025 so
22	that PG&E can focus on safety. You
23	understand that Diablo Canyon is scheduled to
24	be closed in 2024 and 2025; right?
25	A Yes.
26	Q And so that will end the largest
27	portion of PG&E's generation; is that right?
28	A Well, I mean the hydro system

1	probably has more megawatts than Diablo
2	Canyon so I'm not sure what you mean by
3	largest.
4	Q Let's rephrase; the single largest?
5	A Single largest, yes.
6	Q I provided to you a chart. It has
7	been marked as Exhibit TURN-X-02. This is a
8	42-page chart. It was provided by PG&E to
9	TURN in response to Data Request TURN-17,
10	Question 3. It shows the organizational
11	structure of the corporation and the utility.
12	Have you had a chance to review that chart?
13	A Very briefly, yes, I've looked
14	through it.
15	Q Okay. Do you have any reason to
16	dispute the information in the chart?
17	A No.
18	MS. KOSS: May we go off the record for
19	a moment?
20	ALJ ALLEN: Off the record.
21	(Off the record.)
22	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
23	BY MS. KOSS:
24	Q Approximately what percentage of
25	PG&E, including the corporation, the utility,
26	according to this 42-page chart is dedicated
27	to electric generation?
28	A You're looking for a percentage?

1	Q There's 42 pages. Can you identify
2	about how many of them are dedicated to
3	electric generation?
4	ALJ ALLEN: Ms. Koss, that exhibit, is
5	that a complete org chart of PG&E or is that
6	excerpts?
7	MS. KOSS: My understanding is that it
8	is a complete org chart of the organizational
9	structure.
10	ALJ ALLEN: Okay. Thank you.
11	THE WITNESS: Basically it looks like
12	there's three pages that are on generation
13	and then there's, I think, another one on
14	electric procurement.
15	BY MS. KOSS:
16	Q So four pages of the organization
17	of the 42 are dedicated to generation and
18	procurement?
19	A I mean obviously there's a lot of
20	shared services in here too where people
21	would support those functions in PG&E.
22	Q And PG&E has about 24,000
23	employees; right?
24	A Yes.
25	Q How many of those employees do you
26	know are dedicated to electric procurement?
27	A I don't know the answer to that.
28	Q Would you agree that it's a small

number? 1 2. Α In the context of 24,000, I'm sure it's a relatively small number. 3 And because it's losing so much 4 Q 5 load to CCAs, PG&E is overprocured for 6 renewables; right? 7 Α Yes. And much of what PG&E's procurement 8 0 9 department is now doing is selling off its 10 excess procurement; is that right? 11 Α That's certainly something that's 12 going on, yes. And that revenue is then credited 13 0 14 back to ratepayers; right? 15 А Yes. 16 You're not suggesting that PG&E end that activity depriving ratepayers of that 17 18 revenue, are you? 19 Α No. 2.0 0 Have you performed a quantitative 21 analysis of safety improvements from PG&E 22 phasing out its electric generation service? 2.3 Α I have not, but if you look at the 24 history of the last 10 years, most of the 25 safety-related issues have arisen with the 26 delivery of energy by PG&E, either gas or 27 electricity, not with the generation. 2.8 Q You, yourself, have not performed

an analysis of safety improvements from PG&E 1 2. phasing out procurement? 3 А No. 4 MS. KOSS: Thank you, your Honor. Ι 5 have no further questions. Thank you, Mr. Beach. 6 7 Thank you, Ms. Koss. ALJ ALLEN: Mr. Bloom. 9 CROSS-EXAMINATION 10 BY MR. BLOOM: 11 0 Good morning, Mr. Beach. My name 12 is Jerry Bloom and I'm here on behalf of the 13 Tort Claims Committee. In your testimony on 14 page three, you express your concern with how 15 the plan complies with AB-1054 in both the 16 short term and the long term; is that 17 correct? 18 А Yes. 19 And assuming that the CPUC approves 2.0 the plan with or without changes, your 21 testimony is that you believe the CPUC needs 22 continuing active oversight of PG&E safety 2.3 and reliability to assure safety and 24 reliability? 25 Yes, I agree with that. Α 26 And that all tools are needed to 27 assure that outcome again, the safe and 2.8 reliable system?

Α 1 Yes. And the focus, if I understand your 2. 0 3 testimony, is as to potential changes that may be needed in the scope and structure of 4 the business; is that correct? 5 6 Α Yes. 7 0 Would you accept that there are other reasons besides potential changes to 9 scope and structure of the business that 10 might need to be adjusted in this interim or 11 this continuum period that you're talking 12 about from moving as we move from the short 13 term to the long term? 14 Α Are you saying are there reasons, 15 other reasons, why the scope and structure of 16 PG&E as an organization might need to be 17 adjusted over time? 18 No, that there are other things 19 besides corporate structure and the scope of 2.0 the business that also may need to be 21 adjusted over time in order to assure or move 22 toward safety and reliability? 2.3 Α I mean, obviously there are Sure. 24 a lot of ongoing initiatives in that 25 direction, yes. 26 And can you explain or clarify, 27 given the plan gets adopted or approved by the Commission in the time frame we're 2.8

looking at, how does this work? Where does 1 2. this oversight or where do these things -what's the mechanism to make these 3 adjustments or changes, be they broader 4 5 things or more narrow things, but course 6 corrections, if you will, as we go through 7 the process? How does that work? Well, the Commission has, you know, 9 one of the -- they have still open the safety culture of OII, and one of our 10 11 recommendations is that that case needs to 12 remain open and that that certainly -- the Commission has held several workshops and 13 14 taken a lot of thoughtful and important 15 comments in that process, and that some of 16 the recommendations that have been made in that process need to be, you know, remain on 17 18 the table and remain something that, if 19 necessary, the Commission could use in the 2.0 future. 21 So in addition to that proceeding 22 that you've just cited, there's a number of 2.3 other parts of the plan or limitations that 24 aren't part of the record yet, aren't part of 25 the actual plan; is that correct? 26 example, the regional reorganization plan 27 that's yet to be developed? 2.8 А I mean that is in extremely

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skeletal form. And, you know, there are going to be a lot of important details about how that's going to work that the Commission is going to need to review going forward.

Q So the Commission's decision that will be made pursuant to this proceeding will be on the existing plan, but there's a number of other things that will occur as we move through immediately and through the longer term such as the restructuring plan, a number of other things that are going to be filled in, the details, that will be filed, as we move through this. That's correct.

So beyond the safety proceeding, there may be a number of other proceedings.

A Yes, and I think we had a lot of discussion this morning about the ratepayer neutrality aspect, which, you know, in our view is something that -- it's not just a snapshot in time. You know, we're not just going to take one snapshot as of the moment PG&E emerges from its plan and decide it's ratepayer neutral.

Q So just using it just again for clarification, at the time we're going to make this decision, move forward, and get PG&E out of bankruptcy, and get them into the Wildfire Fund, there will be a snapshot right

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now that we have to look at as the plan is developed, as the plan is now sitting before the Commission, saying, this meets the standard, and we're going to have to make that determination.

We can't make the long-term determination yet. Lots of things -- lots of other things will come later, but you agree that for right now we have to look at the plan and what's before the Commission.

They're going to make a decision on what's here in front of us right now.

A Yes. For better or for worse, the legislature put a deadline, and that's why we're in this sort of rocket docket to get us to June 30th, but this is also a really important moment for the long term, and it's important for the Commission to at least indicate an outline of what it wants PG&E to look like going forward.

We're not going to be able to fill in all the details of what that picture should be, but it is a really important moment to provide some kind of outline.

Q And your testimony, if I understand it, would be, as you develop later in your testimony, that that includes the metrics or the measurements or even the milestones that

2.8

Α

Yes.

need to be considered or met or looked at as 1 2. we move forward as they exit the bankruptcy? Α 3 Yes. And do those metrics, milestones, 4 0 things, how and where do they get developed 5 6 or how does that get adjusted or as these 7 filings get made, how does the Commission use those tools or develop those tools and criteria? 9 Well, I think we've had some 10 Δ 11 discussion about the financial metrics, and there's the Cost of Capital update proceeding 12 that has been established, and for that, you 13 14 know, again, there's the ongoing Safety 15 Culture proceeding, and it's our 16 recommendation that that should stay open and the Commission should retain its full 17 18 jurisdictional flexibility to take any action 19 in that proceeding that's necessary going 2.0 forward as circumstances evolve. 21 So from a victim's perspective, 22 particularly as to safety and reliability, 2.3 the ability to make these course corrections 24 in your opinion would be necessary to 25 optimize the outcome of maintaining a safe 26 and reliable system and avoiding catastrophic 27 or other unacceptable events going forward?

I mean, we -- if the last few

1	years have taught us anything, it's, you
2	know, there may be additional shocks in the
3	future. Hopefully not, but, you know, you
4	have to prepare for that.
5	And the Commission needs to be able
6	to respond to what happens in the future with
7	all the tools it has available.
8	MR. BLOOM: Thank you, Mr. Beach. I
9	have no further questions.
10	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Bloom.
11	My understanding is this completes
12	the cross-examination of Mr. Beach; is that
13	correct, Mr. Cragg?
14	MR. CRAGG: Yes, your Honor.
15	ALJ ALLEN: Is there any redirect?
16	MR. FOX: No, your Honor. Thank you.
17	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Beach. You
18	are excused.
19	Let's go off the record.
20	(Off the record.)
21	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
22	Mr. Fox.
23	MR. FOX: Your Honor, the Joint CCAs
24	would like to move what has been marked as
25	Exhibit JCC-01, the Prepared Reply Testimony
26	of R. Thomas Beach into the record.
27	ALJ ALLEN: Is there any objection for
28	receipt of that exhibit?

1	(No response.)
2	(Exhibit No. JOINT CCA-01 was
3	received into evidence.)
4	ALJ ALLEN: Seeing none.
5	Joint CCA-01 is received.
6	Thank you, Mr. Fox.
7	Mr. Alcantar.
8	MR. ALCANTAR: Your Honor, at this time
9	TURN/EPUC and Indicated Shippers calls
10	Michael Gorman to the stand.
11	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
12	MICHAEL GORMAN, called as a witness
13	<pre>by TURN/EPUC/IS, having been sworn, testified as follows:</pre>
14	ALJ ALLEN: Please be seated. State
15	your full name and spell your last name for
16	the record.
17	THE WITNESS: My name is Michael,
18	M-i-c-h-a-e-l, Gorman, G-o-r-m-a-n.
19	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
20	Mr. Alcantar.
21	MR. ALCANTAR: Your Honor, there are a
22	few documents that have been marked for
23	identification, including, EPUC-01 and
24	EPUC-01-C. I want to make sure that it is
25	clear, as counsel has requested, that we note
26	that of the attachments that are part of the
27	public version, as well as the confidential
28	version of these exhibits, there are some

1	yellow highlights in the attachments.
2	These highlights were made by
3	Mr. Gorman in the review of these documents
4	to highlight areas where he was relying upon
5	particular passages.
6	ALJ ALLEN: Let me just make sure we're
7	clear on which is what. So the previously
8	prepared testimony of Mr. Gorman was marked
9	as TURN/EPUC/IS-02; correct?
10	MR. ALCANTAR: Yes. Thank you, your
11	Honor.
12	ALJ ALLEN: Then you've presented me
13	with exhibits in the hearing room: One is an
14	EPUC Response to PG&E's Data Request, Set 1,
15	and accompanying attachments, and my
16	understanding is that would be marked as just
17	EPUC-01.
18	MR. ALCANTAR: Correct. That is a
19	public version.
20	(Exhibit No. EPUC-01 was marked for identification.)
21	identification.)
22	ALJ ALLEN: A public version of that
23	document. And then you have provided a
24	there's a one-page attachment to that
25	document that is confidential.
26	MR. ALCANTAR: The so-called
27	"Attachment 13."
28	ALJ ALLEN: And what I have done is I

1	have marked that as EPUC-01-A-C. So it's an
2	attachment that's confidential, and that is
3	identified as EPUC-01-A-C.
4	(Exhibit No. EPUC-01-A-C was marked for identification.)
5	for identification.)
6	ALJ ALLEN: And then the other document
7	that was provided is the Attachment to PG&E's
8	Omnibus Supplemental Data Response, Set 2, on
9	February 19th, et cetera, and that would be
10	identified as EPUC-02; correct?
11	MR. ALCANTAR: Correct.
12	(Exhibit No. EPUC-02 was marked for identification.)
13	rdentification.
14	ALJ ALLEN: Okay. That one is
15	identified as EPUC-02. And then the
16	highlighted text you are discussing is in
17	which exhibit?
18	MR. ALCANTAR: EPUC-01.
19	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. Go ahead.
20	MR. ALCANTAR: I should also, I think,
21	point out to you EPUC-02 also has a
22	confidential version for materials that were
23	deemed by PG&E to be confidential. Still,
24	I'm not sure how many of those documents
25	still remain confidential - to be perfectly
26	blunt with you this morning - from PG&E's
26 27	blunt with you this morning - from PG&E's standpoint, but there was a previously-marked

1	is EPUC-02-C.
2	ALJ ALLEN: Okay. I'm not sure that
3	has been marked for record. Just to be
4	clear, EPUC-02-C is a confidential version of
5	EPUC-02.
6	MR. ALCANTAR: Correct.
7	(Exhibit No. EPUC-02-C was marked for identification.)
8	for identification.)
9	ALJ ALLEN: Okay. Thank you.
10	MR. ALCANTAR: Lastly, to be somewhat
11	efficient, PG&E has agreed that these
12	documents, as identified by stipulation, may
13	be entered into the record.
14	ALJ ALLEN: Is that everything that
15	we've talked about, including TURN/EPUC/IS or
16	just EPUC-01, EPUC-01-A-C, EPUC-02 and
17	EPUC-02-C?
18	MR. ALCANTAR: The latter. The EPUC
19	testimony that Mr. Gorman is supporting in
20	conjunction with TURN and IS is still subject
21	to cross.
22	ALJ ALLEN: So is there any objection
23	to the receipt into the record of EPUC-01,
24	EPUC-01-A-C, EPUC-02 or EPUC-02-C?
25	MR. WEISSMANN: Can we be off the
26	record for a moment?
27	ALJ ALLEN: Yes.
28	(Off the record.)

1	ALJ ALLEN: On the record. We'll hold
2	that motion in abeyance for now while the
3	parties may examine and confer.
4	Mr. Alcantar, you may present your
5	witness.
6	MR. ALCANTAR: Thank you, your Honor.
7	DIRECT EXAMINATION
8	BY MR. ALCANTAR:
9	Q Mr. Gorman, do you have before you
10	what's been marked for purposes of
11	identification TURN/EPUC/IS Exhibit 2, which
12	is your Prepared Reply Testimony in this
13	case?
14	A I do.
15	Q Was that information or testimony
16	prepared under your direction?
17	A It was.
18	Q And do you adopt it as true and
19	correct?
20	A I do.
21	MR. ALCANTAR: This witness is
22	available for cross-examination.
23	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Alcantar.
24	Mr. Weissmann.
25	CROSS-EXAMINATION
26	BY MR. WEISSMANN:
27	Q Good morning. My name is Henry
28	Weissmann. I'm one of the attorneys

representing PG&E in this matter. 1 2 А Good morning. 3 0 Please turn to your testimony, 4 page 20. I'm there. 5 Α Directing your attention to lines 6 0 7 15 through 18. А I'm there. 8 9 Q You state: "Approximately, \$5.8 10 billion of RSA debt will be subject to the 11 financing of the company's post-exit credit 12 rating and cost of debt. The change in 13 interest rate for this other RSA debt has 14 simply not been estimated by PG&E in its 15 testimony, " end quote. 16 Do you see that? 17 Α I do. 18 So is it your understanding the 19 portion of the debt under the noteholder RSA 2.0 will be issued at market interest rates? 21 Well, at the time I wrote this 22 testimony it was unclear to me whether or not 2.3 that was going to be repriced. In data 24 submittals by the company since then it 25 appears as though it may be reinstated at 26 coupon rates that previously existed, but it 27 was unclear to me at the time I filed this 2.8 testimony.

1	Q All right. And at the time you
2	filed this testimony, you had Mr. Wells'
3	testimony; right?
4	A I did.
5	Q Would you please turn to Mr. Wells'
6	testimony. You have a binder there that you
7	might want to look at. It's in Tab 5.
8	A I'm there.
9	Q Turn to page 2-28.
10	A I'm there.
11	Q So there's subsections (a), (b) and
12	(c) on pages 20 and 29. Do you see that?
13	A I do.
14	Q And these passages describe the
15	terms of the debt being issued pursuant to
16	the noteholder RSA; correct?
17	A That's correct.
18	Q So if we look at (a), it states,
19	and I'm reading from page 2-28, starting at
20	line 5: "1,949 million in new notes bearing
21	an interest Rate of 3.15 percent."
22	Do you see that?
23	A I do.
24	Q A little further down, starting at
25	line 10, it refers to another 1,949 million
26	of notes bearing an interest rate of 4.5;
26 27	of notes bearing an interest rate of 4.5; correct?

And then if we turn to page 2-29, 1 0 2. we have the medium-term notes, and referencing around line 3, it's stated that 3 the interest rate on that issue would be 3.45 5 percent; correct? 6 Α Correct. 7 0 And then on line 8, 3.75 percent; correct? 8 9 Α Yes. 10 0 And are these the notes you were 11 referencing that add up to the 5.8 billion? 12 Α Appear to be. So your testimony was in error? 13 0 14 Α Well, there was stated interest I could have 15 I don't know. 16 articulated more clearly. There was a lot of 17 information to consume in this. The interest 18 rates were more firmly stated than what I was 19 originally -- understood, but I don't know 2.0 whether or not these stated interest rates in 21 any way reflects the credit standing of the 22 utility as it exits bankruptcy. 2.3 Yeah, but is it --0 24 Α From that standpoint, it will not 25 be refinanced at market rates, but the stated interest rates on these notes has been 26 27 identified exiting bankruptcy, but I can't

say for certain whether or not those interest

1	rates were impacted by the credit standing.
2	Q Yeah. That wasn't my question.
3	ALJ ALLEN: Well, your question was, he
4	made an error.
5	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes.
6	ALJ ALLEN: So I think he's explaining
7	why maybe
8	MR. WEISSMANN: Well
9	ALJ ALLEN: Go ahead, Mr. Weissmann.
10	BY MR. WEISSMANN:
11	Q Your testimony on page 20 was that
12	the interest rate for this other RSA debt
13	simply has not been estimated by PG&E in it
14	its testimony. That was in error.
15	A It has been estimated. So that's
16	correct.
17	Q Turn to page 12 of your testimony.
18	A I'm there.
19	Q Lines 5 through 8.
20	So here you assert that costs
21	directly associated with the bankruptcy
22	should not be included in the development of
23	prospective rates; correct?
24	A Yes.
25	Q Turning to page 21, lines 5
26	through 6. Are you there?
27	A Yes, I am.
28	Q And here you reference other

aspects of PG&E's debt interest cost that may 1 result in increased interest cost as a result 2. of PG&E's filing for bankruptcy; correct? 3 Α I do. 4 So is it your recommendation that 5 0 the Commission examine the costs that 6 7 ratepayers pay compared to the cost they would have paid in a world in which there 8 9 would have been no bankruptcy? 10 Α In measuring whether or not the 11 bankruptcy elected debt interest rate 12 savings, I would recommend that the 13 Commission consider whether or not there were 14 increases in interest rates, cost associated 15 with the bankruptcy in determining whether or 16 not the net impact from the bankruptcy had the effect of producing interest rate savings 17 18 to customers or interest rate cost. 19 Right. And to determine if there 2.0 were increased costs, you would compare the 21 actual costs to the costs that would have 22 existed had there not been a bankruptcy; 2.3 correct? 2.4 А To the extent there is increased 25 interest cost that can be attributable to the 26 bankruptcy filing. 27 Right. I'm asking you how you would determine that. So my question is, 2.8

increased compared to what? 1 Increased 2. compared to a world in which there was no bankruptcy? 3 There would be increased cost 4 associated with what the company's actual 5 interest costs are, and then exiting 6 7 bankruptcy compared to what the interest rates would have been had it not filed for 8 9 bankruptcy. Thank you. 10 0 11 And in that hypothetical world in 12 which there was no bankruptcy, are you 13 assuming that there would have been wildfire 14 claims' costs? 15 I haven't made the assumption yet, Α 16 but it would be an estimate based on the 17 financial condition and the borrowing cost of 18 the utility that would exclude any financial 19 consequences of costs that are not 2.0 appropriate for government -- for retail 21 ratepayers. 22 Let me try the question again. 2.3 So you're saying we should compare 2.4 the actual costs that PG&E will incur to the 25 costs it would have incurred without a 1 26 bankruptcy? 27 I'm not really following your 2.8 methodology. I guess it's similar but a

1	little different. I think there might be
2	identifiable interest costs the utility would
3	incur that are attributable to it having
4	filed for bankruptcy. Or having heard
5	certain costs that may not be recoverable
6	from retail customers.
7	Either instance there may be
8	increased interest costs, but that would not
9	be appropriate for recovery from retail
10	customers.
11	Q A few minutes ago and I'll reset
12	this premise. Maybe I need to go back over
13	it. I think you said as increased costs
14	to determine if there are increase costs, we
15	compare the actual costs to a world in which
15 16	compare the actual costs to a world in which there was no bankruptcy; correct?
16	there was no bankruptcy; correct?
16 17	there was no bankruptcy; correct? A Yeah. But I wasn't limiting it to
16 17 18	there was no bankruptcy; correct? A Yeah. But I wasn't limiting it to that.
16 17 18 19	there was no bankruptcy; correct? A Yeah. But I wasn't limiting it to that. Q So it's increased costs that would
16 17 18 19 20	there was no bankruptcy; correct? A Yeah. But I wasn't limiting it to that. Q So it's increased costs that would have existed in a world without bankruptcy
16 17 18 19 20 21	there was no bankruptcy; correct? A Yeah. But I wasn't limiting it to that. Q So it's increased costs that would have existed in a world without bankruptcy and without wildfire claims?
16 17 18 19 20 21	there was no bankruptcy; correct? A Yeah. But I wasn't limiting it to that. Q So it's increased costs that would have existed in a world without bankruptcy and without wildfire claims? A It's any increased costs that are
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	there was no bankruptcy; correct? A Yeah. But I wasn't limiting it to that. Q So it's increased costs that would have existed in a world without bankruptcy and without wildfire claims? A It's any increased costs that are associated imprudent or unreasonable
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	there was no bankruptcy; correct? A Yeah. But I wasn't limiting it to that. Q So it's increased costs that would have existed in a world without bankruptcy and without wildfire claims? A It's any increased costs that are associated imprudent or unreasonable (Phone interruption.)
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	there was no bankruptcy; correct? A Yeah. But I wasn't limiting it to that. Q So it's increased costs that would have existed in a world without bankruptcy and without wildfire claims? A It's any increased costs that are associated imprudent or unreasonable (Phone interruption.) ALJ ALLEN: Off the record.

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BY MR. WEISSMANN:

Q I apologize. Let me go back over this. So you're referencing increased costs. And to determine if they're increased costs, you would compare the actual costs to a world in which there was no bankruptcy and no fires?

A I am describing a situation where we identify increased costs that are not appropriate to recover from retail customers.

Those increased costs can be attributable to imprudent actions of the utility for costs that simply aren't reasonable. Factors that have resulted in the utility incurring unreasonable costs include its bankruptcy filing and certain consequences of wildfire damage claims imposed on the utility in 2017 and 2018.

Q So to implement your recommendation, would the Commission need to conduct a review into the prudence of PG&E's actions relative to the 2017 and 2018 fires?

A If the utility makes a claim that the costs related to those fires were prudent and reasonable, I think the Commission would want the record on whether or not the utility's claim was accurate.

Q Sorry. Let me back up. Let me see

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if I can define some terms that will maybe
make this easier. You're comparing the
actual costs to the baseline. And we'll
define the baseline as a world in which there
were no bankruptcy, and I think you're saying
no fire claims costs that are deemed
imprudent; is that correct?

A Well, I haven't completely designed the analysis that I think it would be necessary in order to identify whether or not costs were inappropriate for recovery from customers. But the basic objective would be to identify costs which were incurred as a result of imprudent management or costs which are found to be unreasonable.

And based on this record, I would suggest that costs related to the bankruptcy filing, which in part was triggered by the 2017 and 2018 wildfire damage claims against the utility, would fall into that imprudent and unreasonable category.

Q But there's been no determination of whether PG&E's conduct was imprudent or unreasonable; correct?

A I haven't reviewed whether or not there's been a determination of that. I do know that 2017 and 2018 settlements were part of the reorganization plan to deal with the

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bankruptcy filing.

Q Right. But there was no finding or admission of imprudence or unreasonableness.

A I'm not aware of the utility asserting in any way that the costs incurred for the '17 and '18 wildfire damage claims as prudent and reasonable. So I'm not aware of any utility responding to the assertion the utility hasn't yet made.

Q To implement your recommendation to define the baseline, the Commission would have to make a determination with respect to prudence the reasonableness of the utility's conduct; right?

A They would if the utility saw a recovery of cost from customers, yes. I presume they would. That's really a legal question. But I presume there would be a finding that the Commission would use in order to determine whether or not they're appropriate for recovery of rates from retail customers.

Q But if the utility doesn't seek recovery of the costs, we're just implementing your baseline concept, they would still need to make that finding; right?

A When? When they file rates? If the utility doesn't seek recovery of those

Q

costs, the Commission wouldn't need to assess 1 2. whether or not the company is seeking to recover costs which are a result of imprudent 3 actions or costs that are unreasonable. 4 5 Right. But to implement your 6 baseline, they would have to make that 7 finding; correct? My baseline is to not include costs 8 Α 9 in the development of rates which the 10 Commission finds to be imprudent or unreasonable. To the extent the utility 11 12 doesn't seek recovery of such costs, then the Commission would not need to make a finding 13 14 of the unreasonable or imprudence of the cost 15 if they're not subject to have cost the 16 utility's seeking to recover in rates. 17 Okay. So in your hypothetical 0 18 world without bankruptcy, without imprudent 19 costs, would we also posit that inverse 2.0 condemnation exists as a legal document? 21 Α I think you would look to the 22 actual circumstances facing the risk of the 2.3 utility as it actually stood. As well as 24 legislation which mitigated the risk of 25 utility investors to inverse condemnation. 26 Yes, those would be factors that would be considered, yes. 27

And so we're talking about the

world before the bankruptcy? Or the world in 1 2 the future? We would be talking about the world 3 in which the utility files its test year 4 proceeding seeking certain costs to be 5 6 included in the development of its revenue 7 requirement and recovery of retail rates. So it would be based on that 8 9 context whether or not any of those costs included and costs of service should be 10 11 excluded on the basis of imprudence or 12 unreasonableness. So we would consider the risks 13 14 associated with wildfires? If it was relevant in that future 15 Δ 16 test year to the extent inverse condemnation 17 and other regulatory practices by the 18 Commission are a factor in establishing the 19 utility's credit standing and access to 2.0 capital. 21 Now, had you set forth an analysis 22 of the cost that PG&E's ratepayers would have 2.3 paid in a world without the bankruptcy? 24 Α Not in this case. 25 But you would ask the Commission to 0 26 catalog those costs? I would ask the Commission to set a 27 Α

standard that costs that are either imprudent

or unreasonable would not be included in the 1 2. development of perspective rates. Those costs in this case would 3 include bankruptcy-related costs, which 4 includes the settlement claims for 2017 and 5 2018 wildfire damage. 6 7 Well, those -- okay. 0 What we're talking about here is 9 the cost of debt; correct? 10 Α What we're talking about here is 11 whether or not the bankruptcy has resulted in 12 debt interest rate savings. Right so we have to posit what the 13 14 cost of debt would have been? 15 We have to respond to the utility's Α 16 claim that there is interest rate savings 17 that was produced by the bankruptcy filing. 18 And in doing that, I acknowledge that there 19 may have been interest rate savings 2.0 associated with high coupon debt that you were able to refinance down to market levels 21 22 that you may not have been able to 2.3 economically refinance absent the bankruptcy. 2.4 And whether or not those debt interest rate 25 savings were offset by increased interest 26 costs that were related to bankruptcy filing. 27 So let's talk about that. Riaht. So to determine what the increased cost may 2.8

have been, we have to limit it, as you said, 1 2. to actions of PG&E; right? Within factors that would have lead 3 Α to the degradation in its bond rate. 4 may have been avoided had it not needed to 5 file bankruptcy. 6 7 Well, certainly changes -- would you agree that the actual improved cost of 9 debt for Edison and San Diego are reasonable 10 comparatives? 11 Not necessarily with PG&E. cost of debt would reflect their contractual 12 provisions and the time period where they 13 14 went to the market to issue debt and the contractual limits to refinance that debt. 15 16 I think both of their embedded debt 17 structures are reasonable. But they may or 18 may not be an appropriate benchmark for 19 comparing the reasonableness of PG&E's 2.0 embedded debt. 21 In fact, PG&E's cost of debt coming 22 out of bankruptcy will be lower than Edison 2.3 and San Diego's authorized cost of debt; 2.4 correct? 25 А Well, you've estimated that, yes. 26 So that is my understanding. No reason to 27 dispute it. My dispute is whether or not

you've considered all factors that support

your assertion that the bankruptcy has 1 2. produced interest rate savings. 3 Q Were you here yesterday for Ms. Meal's testimony? 4 5 А I was not. Ms. Meal, I'll represent to you, 6 7 testified that it would be highly speculative to try to construct a world in which PG&E had 8 9 not declared bankruptcy. Do you agree? 10 Α I think you could produce a 11 reasonable proxy looking at what has occurred with other California utilities. 12 What has occurred with other 13 14 California utilities but not their authorized cost of debt? 15 16 Α Well, yeah. There's an apples and 17 oranges comparison of that. Because the 18 contractual terms and the time periods they 19 went to the market to sell that may have 2.0 produced embedded debt costs, which are 21 unique to those specific factors. 22 don't make them a reasonable comparison to what PG&E's embedded costs would have been 2.3 24 had it not been constrained by its bankruptcy 25 filing and significant erosion to its credit 26 standing. 27 0 Yeah. But if PG&E had not declared

bankruptcy, you said they couldn't have

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renegotiated their existing debt?

A Right. But there are other -there are other debt issues or even new debt
issues that may have been issued at more
favorable interest rates that would result in
a reduction of debt relative to that embedded
debt structure they had in 2019.

Q May have been. So have you quantified that?

A I haven't. I attempted to get that kind of information from the company to see what debt issues might have been subject to refinancing from 2017 forward in the discovery request where I asked them to provide the list of embedded debt cost structure for the utility before and after bankruptcy. And the utility was not able to provide that.

That would have told me whether or not there were certain issues, bond issues, or note issues for the company that may have been subject to maturing or refinancing during 2018 and 2019. Which may have resulted in a reduction in the embedding of that cost structure if there were not constraints caused by the bankruptcy filing.

Q Caused by the bankruptcy filing. Okay. Let's talk about that for a minute.

So if PG&E had issued new debt in 1 January 2019 before it filed for bankruptcy, 2 those would have reflected its sub-investment 3 grade credit rating at the time; right? 4 Well, PG&E's bond rating eroded 5 6 significantly before it actually filed for bankruptcy. So I would say that probably 7 through most of 2018, its bond rating was 8 9 downgraded before Southern Cal or San 10 Diego's. 11 Its dividend was suspended at the 12 beginning of the year because they were 13 signalling to the market of significant 14 liability exposure associated with wildfire 15 damage claims. So there's many factors which 16 was providing clear signals to the market 17 that the wildfire damage claims against the 18 utility were causing financial stress. Those 19 distresses did not exist at the other 2.0 utilities. So --21 MR. WEISSMANN: Move to strike, your 22 Honor, as nonresponsive. I asked a very 2.3 simple question, and he's off on a different 24 topic. 25 MR. ALCANTAR: No. That is directly 26 responsive. 27 No. My question was --MR. WEISSMANN: 2.8 ALJ ALLEN: Okay. Stop.

1	Let's go ahead. Ask another
2	question, and allow the witness to answer the
3	question. I actually thought there was some
4	interesting material in the answer.
5	But I'll allow you to proceed.
6	Please ask another question.
7	BY MR. WEISSMANN:
8	Q Had PG&E issued new debt in
9	January '19 withdrawn.
10	In January '19 before PG&E filed
11	for bankruptcy, its credit rating was
12	sub-investment grade; correct?
13	A It fell below investment grade
14	based on my notes around January 7th of 2019.
15	Q And had PG&E issued debt at that
16	time, the cost of that debt would have
17	reflected that credit rating; correct?
18	A It would have. And the bottom
19	grading reflected any significant liability
20	obligations of the utility, which ultimately
21	lead to the bankruptcy filing.
22	Q In your opinion, would the interest
23	rate on such debt issued in January 2019 have
24	been lower than interest rate on the debtor
25	in possession financing?
26	A I don't know. I presume it would
27	be reasonably comparable. The debtor in
28	possession financing and senior loan rate,

1	which may have given it a more favorable
2	interest rate than what PG&E could have
3	issued on a non-secured basis at that time.
4	But, again, the interest rate was
5	caused by the factors leading up to the
6	degrading of its bond rating.
7	Q Okay. Turning back to your
8	testimony, page 21. So starting on line 8,
9	you refer to a variety of factors that could
10	lead to increased costs; correct?
11	A Yes, that's correct.
12	Q And has PG&E proposed to increase
13	customer rates to reflect any of the items
14	you mentioned?
15	A No. They have not. The cost of
16	capital is based on the information that was
17	available prior to the utility filing their
18	restructuring plan.
19	Q In fact, the only change in
20	customer rates coming out of the Plan of
21	Reorganization that PG&E has proposed is to
22	update the cost of capital; right?
23	A I need to review that. But I
24	believe I certainly they did ask to adjust
25	their cost of capital, yes.
25	cherres or capitar, yes.
26	Q Okay. Sticking on page 22,

You refer to collateral posting, 1 0 2. and you refer to the interest rate of 4.75 3 percent? Α Yes. 4 So is it your contention that 5 6 PG&E's post bankruptcy interest rate and 7 collateral postings would be 4.75 percent? It's my best estimate. 8 That's what 9 you estimate your cost of debt to be that 10 that's on. And what I was looking for was a 11 proxy for essentially making deposits for 12 commodity purchases. And the interest rate would relate 13 14 to whatever that cost of deposit would be. 15 And I estimated it to 4.75 percent because 16 that was one estimate you made of what your 17 cost of debt would be in one of your debt 18 interest rate savings calculations. 19 Sorry. Is the average interest 2.0 rate under the note holder RSA on the high 21 coupon prepetition debt exchange rate? 22 Α It is, yes. 2.3 So do you have an understanding of how short term debt costs are recovered in 24 25 rates? 26 Α Depends on what the purpose of the 27 short-term debt is. Typically short-term

debt is used to finance construction work in

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progress. And those short-term debt interest rates are capitalized along with plans in service.

If there is any cost -- use of short-term debt in providing direct service to customers, then they recover that interest cost in line with the need for that borrowing instrument to provide service.

Q According to the actual cost? Or according to a prescribed interest rate established by the Commission based on the commercial rate?

A Well, the actual cost would be based on the prescribed interest rate in the company's borrowing facility. It should reflect what the company's actual cost is unless the Commission found that that cost was inappropriate for setting rates. In which case, it would be based on what the Commission found to be appropriate for setting rates.

Q So just to clarify, it's your understanding that California ratemaking that the actual cost of short-term debt is flowed through into rates as you describe?

A I think my description related to capitalized construction period, capital costs, and whether or not there was any use

in short-term borrowing estimates in 1 2. providing retail service. To the extent the utility relies 3 predominantly on long-term capital monthly 4 costs to fund working capital and plant 5 6 investment, then short-term debt probably 7 wouldn't be included in base rates. It would be included in construction work in progress as first point investments. 10 For capital projects. 0 But I'm 11 saying expense for like -- well, collateral 12 postings? That would be part of the working 13 14 capital requirements, which likely would be include in the ratebase. 15 16 Are you familiar with treasury 17 operations? 18 А Of PG&E? 19 Yes. Or generally. Q 2.0 I'm not sure what you mean by Α 21 treasury operations. But I'm accustomed to 22 measuring utility cost for including in 2.3 developing in utility rates. 24 Are you familiar with the financing 25 instruments used to satisfy collateral requirements? 26 27 А So there's various methods. 2.8 could be a prepayment in commodities, which

1	is what I was assuming in this example here.
2	Others could be posting bonds. Others can be
3	letter irrevocable letters of credits.
4	So there may be ways of supporting
5	that collateralized that guarantee for
6	payment that may raise different costs than
7	what I've estimated. But for this purpose, I
8	was assuming prepayment in commodities.
9	Q So for if a letter of credit
10	were posted, what would be the cost?
11	A Typically be stated in the letter
12	of credit what your revocable line of credit
13	would be to the utility.
14	Q Much lower than this 4.75 percent;
15	correct?
16	A Depends on the credit standing of
17	the utility and the cost the bank demands for
18	offering the irrevocable item credit. Could
19	be lower.
20	Q So setting aside, in a world in
21	which there had been no bankruptcy, PG&E
22	would have required access to short-term debt
23	facilities; correct?
24	A Yes.
25	Q And have you analyzed what PG&E's
26	short-term debt needs would have been in that
27	world?
28	A I have not.

1	Q So do you have an opinion about
2	withdrawn.
3	In 2018 PG&E asked for an increase
4	in its short-term debt authorization to
5	\$6 billion; correct?
6	A That is correct, yes. I know they
7	asked for change. I believe it was \$6
8	billion.
9	Q That was before the bankruptcy;
10	correct?
11	A I believe that's correct.
12	Q Okay turn to I guess we still
13	are page 21 of your testimony, please.
14	A Okay.
15	Q So here you assert that PG&E's
16	financial position post emergence should be
17	compared to PG&E's financial position in
18	2017; correct?
19	A Well, I looked at the difference in
20	bond rating from the end of 2017 down to what
21	they've estimated the bond rating would be
22	post emergence. I'm estimating that change
23	in bond rating.
24	You'll note that the A minus bond
25	rating was an unsecured bond rating. And the
26	Baa2 is a secured bond rating.
27	Q Right. So are you saying that the
28	relevant comparison baseline should be A

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A Well, that is the actual change in bond rating from secured down to secured.

And I think it's probably pretty good. I'll continue to review this throughout this hearing and in consideration of the other California utilities' bond ratings.

I think the other California utilities' bond ratings were decreased in 2019 in result of the wildfire damage claims and the inverse condemnation risk.

I looked at Southern California
Edison's bond rating. It decreased from
around Triple B plus from S&P down to Triple
B. That's an unsecured bond rating.

And I think the difference between unsecured and a secured bond rating is about a two-notch rating category. I believe Mr. Plaster of PG&E confirmed that.

So a Triple B for an unsecured bond rating at SCE would be equivalent to an A minus if it had a secured bond rating, which is essentially what PG&E's bond rating was at the end of 2019.

So there's some of the initial assessments I've made in changing credit standing and potential increase in borrowing costs of PG&E as a result of its financial

1	distress caused by its bankruptcy filing in
2	protecting its against its wildfire damage
3	claims.
4	Q Let me just clarify. Edison was a
5	Triple B plus, then went down to Triple B;
6	correct?
7	A Correct. That's an unsecured bond
8	rating.
9	Q PG&E was at A minus; correct?
10	A Yes.
11	Q So you're saying PG&E should stay
12	at A minus as the baseline even though Edison
13	was decreased to Triple B?
14	A I thought you were asking me would
15	the proxy of a A minus bond rating from PG&E
16	not filing for bankruptcy, is that
17	reasonable?
18	Q Yes.
19	A And I was walking through the logic
20	under why I think it's a reasonable starting
21	point. If without bankruptcy if Southern
22	Cal Edison had gone from Triple B plus to
23	Triple B on an unsecured bond rating, and if
24	the secured bond rating was two notches
25	stronger than Triple B, that would put it at
26	about A minus, which is what PG&E's bond
27	rating was at the end of 2017.
28	Q For unsecured?

1	A For unsecured. So if the spread
2	for a secured bond rating post emergency is
3	minimum investment grade of Triple B minus
4	versus A minus, that might be available to it
5	on a secured basis. Had it not filed for
6	bankruptcy, then it would be about a full
7	notch downgrade in its credit standing.
8	Q Right. If you're using Edison as a
9	benchmark, my point is withdrawn.
10	Just as a matter of history, PG&E's
11	credit ratings began dropping in early 2018;
12	correct?
13	A They did. I think the first
14	downgrade was in February 2018.
15	Q By July of 2018, PG&E was at a low
16	investment grade?
17	A I have at June 13th, it was
18	downgraded to Triple B by S&P. Baa by
19	Moody's.
20	Q And
21	A Its minimum investment grade came
22	in November 2018.
23	Q Thank you. And so these downgrades
24	obviously and we already established it
25	was below investment grade in January 2019;
26	right?
27	A January 7th is when I noted that it
28	was downgraded to below investment grade by

both S&P and Moody's. 1 So these occurred before PG&E filed 2. for Chapter 11 on January 29, 2019; correct? 3 Α They did. You know, but they were 4 all leading up to the understanding of the 5 6 financial distress the company was under as a 7 result of 2017 and 2018 wildfire damage claims. 8 9 Q Why are you proposing to use PG&E's 10 2017 rating as opposed to the national 11 average for investor-owned utilities? 12 Well, the objective here is to 13 attempt to gauge what the additional interest 14 expense will be as a result of the financial 15 erosion of PG&E and reduction of its credit 16 rating caused by, you know, the events that 17 lead it ultimately to file for bankruptcy. 18 The California regulatory 19 mechanisms are important considerations in 2.0 assigning bond ratings. PG&E's service 21 territory, economic strength of its service 22 territory is relevant. The California 2.3 regulatory mechanisms also apply to other 24 California utilities. 25 So I think the question is more 26 limited to what the credit rating would be 27 for the larger electric and gas utility

inside California that did not suffer the

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same financial distress that PG&E did that 1 2 ultimately caused it to file for bankruptcy. 3 So in making that assessment, I think a general guideline -- I haven't 4 completed the analysis -- but a general 5 6 guideline is the financial distress caused by 7 the wildfire damage claims and the filing for bankruptcy probably had the effect of 8 9 reducing the credit rating by a full credit 10 rating. 11 Q In your opinion, had the 2017 12 wildfires occurred but the Camp Fire had not occurred, would PG&E have filed for 13 14 bankruptcy? 15 I can't speak to specific events. 16 What I really looked at was market responses to the financial distress PG&E was under. 17 18 You suspended your dividend at the beginning 19 of 2018. Your credit rating suffered 2.0 significant downgrades in advance of other 21 California electric utilities companies. So 22 that was more my focus than trying to look at 2.3 the actual events that helped contribute to 24 the significant financial distress for PG&E 25 throughout that time period. 26 And among those events included 27 inverse condemnation; right? 1 That was a risk that California 2.8 Α

utilities have faced for quite some time. 1 Ι 2. think it was highlighted with a disallowance for San Diego Gas & Electric Company. 3 When did that happen? Remind me. 4 0 San Diego Gas & Electric 5 А disallowance, you know, I'd have to double 6 7 check that, but I believe it was maybe five 8 years ago or 2005. 9 MR. WEISSMANN: Off the record just a 10 second, your Honor. 11 ALJ ALLEN: Off the record. (Off the record.) 12 ALJ ALLEN: On the record. 13 14 BY MR. WEISSMANN: 15 And among the other events was the 16 increased risk of wildfires in PG&E's service 17 territory; correct? 18 Well, the risk of wildfire damage 19 in PG&E service territory and whether or not 2.0 the company was doing everything it could to 21 avoid in containing the risk of those, that 22 natural event. Let's take a look at what's 2.3 24 previously marked for identification as 25 PG&E-X-03. It's Tab 9 in your binder. 26 Α I'm there. 27 This is a Moody's report on Edison 2.8 dated April 11, 2018; correct?

1	A That's correct.
2	Q And it reflects negative outlook
3	for Edison; right?
4	A It does.
5	Q Reflecting or referring to strict
6	liability; right?
7	A "A large contingent exposure
8	created by application is strict liability
9	standard in California." That's right.
10	Q Wildfire risk?
11	A "In case of wildfires where utility
12	equipment was determined to be the source of
13	the fire."
14	Q The tax law changes?
15	A Yeah, tax law change did weaken the
16	utility's cash flows, not necessarily to the
17	point where it increased risk, but they did
18	produce a reduction in cash flows.
19	Q So none of these factors is
20	specific to PG&E's bankruptcy; right?
21	A PG&E faced some of the same risk
22	associated with both wildfire exposures and
23	change in the federal tax law. That's true
24	and those were not related to the bankruptcy
25	trial.
26	Q By the way, San Diego Gas &
27	Electric's credit ratings have also declined
28	since 2017; right?

Α They have. 1 2. And that's obviously not due to the 3 Chapter 11 filing; right? Again, their credit rating was 4 downgraded by about two notches on an 5 unsecured basis. 6 Their BBB+, I believe, by 7 S&P for electric operations, one notch stronger than Southern Cal Ed. 9 So PG&E would have been subject to 10 similar changes in its ratings regardless of 11 bankruptcy; right? It would have been 12 subject to the same forces that were 13 affecting Edison and San Diego? 14 Well, I mean it's hard to say Α 15 definitively. I think one thing that kind of 16 put a magnifying glass on the state was PG&E's significant exposure to wildfire 17 18 damage claims that highlighted the interest 19 in the markets of what those risks are and 2.0 what the potential exposure would be to the 21 utilities. 22 So if the wildfire events had not 2.3 occurred and the wildfire damage claims had 24 not been made, then there may not have been 25 downgrades in electric utility companies 26 generally in California in that year. So had 27 those wildfire events not occurred, then I

can't say what would have happened to all the

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utilities' bond ratings in California. 1 2. But presumably if that risk would 3 have been noted by the investment community and PG&E's exposure would have been less to 4 5 the extent it wasn't seeking bankruptcy 6 protection, its bond ratings probably would 7 have been downgraded along with San Diego Gas & Electric and Southern Cal Edison. 9 Okay. And in the future, Edison 10 and San Diego's bond ratings may fluctuate 11 for circumstances unique to them; correct? 12 Α Yes. So how is the Commission to isolate 13 0 14 any effects in the future attributable to the 15 Chapter 11 filing as opposed to other 16 factors? 17 Α I think the Commission should focus 18 on ensuring that costs that are imprudent or 19 unreasonable should not be included in the 2.0 development of the prospective rates. 21 would encourage the Commission to focus on 22 whether or not the utility is seeking to 2.3 recover only prudent and reasonable cost in setting rates. 24 25 But in determining the cost of 26 capital, the cost of debt, you're suggesting

that the Commission compare the actual cost

of debt to cost of debt had the bankruptcy

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and associated events not occurred; correct?

A At this point I'm disputing the company's finding that there are interest rate savings coming out of bankruptcy. I don't believe the company has actually measured what its total impact on interest expense will be or in terms of setting rates prospectively, I imagine that -- I haven't reviewed this yet and I haven't discussed it with either TURN or EPUC or IS on what the appropriate method might be for establishing the cost of utility debt would be appropriate for including in the overall rate of return. I will be making that investigation.

But I can say at this point that I will object and recommend disallowance of any debt interest costs which are the result of imprudent actions of the utility or costs that are unreasonable.

Q And to make that determination and what debt interest costs are attributable to unreasonable or imprudency, you would compare -- your recommendation as to the Commission -- compare the actual interest costs to some benchmark; correct?

A I would look at changes in the company's embedded cost to debt and identify whether or not there are certain issues that

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were at higher interest rates than maybe they would have otherwise been, encourage the Commission to focus on those newly-refinanced debt issues to determine whether or not there are certain debt issue costs that are not appropriate for recovery from retail ratepayers.

Q Right. I'm just trying to explore how this practically would work higher than they would otherwise have been. How is the Commission to determine what they would otherwise have been if it has not conducted a prudence review of the 2017/2018 fire costs?

A Well, I haven't offered any testimony specifically adjusting the embedded cost to debt for the utility, but the focus would be on prudence and reasonableness of cost.

That would include an assessment of whether or not the credit rating and the interest cost -- the credit rating at the time of issue and the interest rate on the security that is issued at that time were negatively impacted because of the company's bankruptcy filing or any other factor that would result in part of the cost being imprudent or unreasonable.

Q Right. And so to make that

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determination, the Commission would have to compare the actual costs to some hypothetical alternative.

A Well --

Q Let me finish my question, please.

My question is in doing so, are you
envisioning that the Commission would look to
Edison and San Diego's cost of debt?

A Well, I haven't taken a position yet, but those would be factors I would consider in attempting to estimate what costs would be more reasonable had they not been attributable to the reduction of bond rating caused by the bankruptcy filing.

Q But in the future, Edison and San Diego's costs could be affected by lots of other factors?

A But I wouldn't be looking at their embedded debt costs. I would be looking at the cost of debt that was issued in, say, a specific month of the year.

Q Right.

A What the market interest rate is on debt at that specific time and assess whether or not the utility's actual cost of debt is above or below markets. If it's above markets and it's attributable to a weakened credit standing, then those costs associated

with that weakened credit standing may not be 1 2. appropriate for recovery for retail 3 customers. Okay. Let's say that PG&E in the 4 0 future issues debt at a lower cost than an 5 incremental new issuance of debt by San Diego 6 7 Gas & Electric. Do you have that assumption in mind? 9 Α I wouldn't make that comparison, 10 but I'll accept that hypothetical. 11 Q Okay. Why wouldn't you make that 12 comparison? There could be other factors. 13 Α 14 The --15 Right. Q 16 -- term of the bond could impact Α 17 the interest rate. I mean, the regulatory 18 mechanisms approved by the Commission for 19 some specific investment may be different for 2.0 San Diego than it would be for PG&E. 21 I think the relevant factor is what 22 would the cost of the new bond issue be for 2.3 PG&E at its actual bond rating from relative 24 to what it might -- the bond rate that might 25 have existed had it not lost its bond rating 26 due to its bankruptcy. 27 And what I'm driving at is Right.

how could the Commission possibly ever

determine what that PG&E interest cost would 1 2 have been? Α I think it would have to look at 3 average bond yields, the comparable bond 4 ratings at the time the bond was sold. 5 By a company like Edison or San 6 7 Diego? It would be just general market 8 interest rates on bond at that rating 9 10 category. It would --11 O Okay, and that --12 Α -- include any utility company with 13 the same bond rating. 14 Sorry, I thought we were saying --15 didn't you say before that what's relevant is 16 Edison and San Diego? 17 In establishing what the bond Α 18 rating target would be, that may be one 19 factor I would rely on to establish what that 2.0 target is. 21 0 Okay. 22 But then the question would be is 2.3 what's the actual bond rating relative to 24 that target and what's the difference in 25 interest cost. Okay. But how do we know what the 26 27 bond rating would have been? 2.8 ALJ ALLEN: Mr. Weissmann, I have a

1	feeling that this question
2	MR. WEISSMANN: Okay. I'll move on.
3	ALJ ALLEN: has been asked.
4	BY MR. WEISSMANN:
5	Q In determining credit ratings,
6	rating agencies look at quantitative metrics;
7	correct?
8	A They do.
9	Q Such as funds from operation to
10	debt and debt to EBITDA?
11	A Correct.
12	Q Have you reviewed those
13	quantitative metrics for PG&E at exit?
14	A PG&E provided financial projections
15	right before I filed my testimony, so I was
16	not able to review their financial
17	projections and include the comment in my
18	testimony. But since I filed my testimony,
19	I've looked at their financial projections
20	and their resulting credit metric outlook of
21	the utility.
22	Q Right. Both at exit and over a
23	five-year forecast period; correct?
24	A Right. I believe in 2020 up to
25	2024 were the financial projections I
26	primarily focused on.
27	Q Are those quantitative metrics
28	comparable to Edison's?

Α I have not made that comparison. 1 2. Are those quantitative metrics similar to those PG&E had in 2017? 3 Α I didn't make those comparisons. 4 Are those quantitative metrics in 5 6 line with the quantitative metrics of other 7 investor-owned utilities with investment-grade issuer ratings? 8 9 Α I didn't make that comparison 10 either. Both S&P and Moody's published 11 credit rating target ranges that support 12 various bond ratings given the business risk, financial risk outlooks of the utilities. 13 14 did look at the projected financial metrics 15 in comparison to those target ranges. 16 And the reason that PG&E Okay. 17 would have a subinvestment-grade issuer 18 rating is because of the rating agency's 19 evaluation of the business risk; correct? 2.0 Well, business risk and financial risk of the company. I mean there is 21 22 significant debt at this company that is not 2.3 used to support investments that produce cash 2.4 So I think that will certainly be a flow. 25 factor to the credit rating agencies when 26 reviewing the adequacy of the credit metrics 27 going forward. If S&P rated the business risk as 2.8 0

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strong, would those credit metrics support an investment-grade credit rating?

- A Well, there --
- O To issuer?

A Well, the greater the business risk, then the higher the financial threshold is supported bond rating. So, the S&P feel previously PG&E had an excellent business profile score, a strong financial profile score, so the range of credit metrics that would support an investment grade BBB or a single A bond rating would depend on S&P's financial and business risk outlook for the utility.

Moody's is similar, but they don't have a specific financial and business risk profile score. They do have various metric ranges, standard ranges, that correspond with credit ratings for utility companies with an assessment of what their business risk is.

For example, they go with standard range with most electric utility companies that have commodity cost recovery risk. For other utility companies that don't have commodity cost recovery risk, there might be a low volatility table they would look at for appropriate credit metric targets. So those are the factors I considered.

1	Q Right. That wasn't my question so
2	let me try again. If S&P rated the business
3	risk for PG&E as strong, strong, would the
4	credit metrics support an investment-grade
5	credit rating at the issuer level?
6	A I'd have to make that
7	determination. I did review them with an
8	excellent business position ranking. That's
9	what S&P rated PG&E around the end of 2017,
10	beginning of 2018. If their business risk
11	assessment changes, then the target metric
12	would change as well.
13	Q So the answer to my question is you
14	don't know?
15	A I haven't looked at it with that
16	business risk position ranking so at this
17	point I do not know.
18	Q Okay. So the business risk ranking
19	for PG&E is based on the rating agency's
20	evaluation of the regulatory environment
21	among other things; correct?
22	A Yeah, but importantly also
23	regulatory environment and management
24	strength are major components that go into
25	business risk ranking.
26	Q Just focusing on the regulatory
27	environment, the rating agencies will
28	consider the predictability and timeliness of

1	Commission decisions; correct?
2	A They will on recovery approved and
3	reasonable costs, which is a standard of
4	ratemaking across the country.
5	ALJ ALLEN: Mr. Weissmann, let's do a
6	time check here.
7	MR. WEISSMANN: Maybe another half
8	hour.
9	ALJ ALLEN: So I'm thinking this might
10	be a good time for a lunch recess. So let's
11	be in recess until one o'clock by the clock
12	on the wall.
13	(Whereupon, at the hour of 12:00 p.m., a recess was taken until 1:00
14	p.m.)
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1	AFTERNOON SESSION - 1:03 P.M.
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3	ALJ ALLEN: Good afternoon. Back on
4	the record. We are resuming the cross of
5	Mr. Gorman by Mr. Weissmann.
6	MR. WEISSMANN: Thank you, your Honor.
7	MICHAEL GORMAN,
8	resumed the stand and testified further as
9	follows:
10	CROSS-EXAMINATION RESUMED
11	BY MR. WEISSMANN:
12	Q Mr. Gorman, were you a witness in
13	the utility/cost of capital proceeding?
14	A Yes.
15	Q In that proceeding, did you
16	recommend that the Commission adjust Edison's
17	cost of debt to reflect what its credit
18	rating would have been had there not been the
19	Thomas and Woolsey fires?
20	A I didn't take a position on the
21	company's cost of debt in the last rate case
22	so I did not make that recommendation.
23	Q Is it your opinion is that the kind
24	of exercise the Commission should do for
25	Edison in the future?
26	A No. In my opinion, the
27	adjustments, if I would make to cost of debt,
28	would reflect eliminating costs that should

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not be included in setting rates. That would include costs that are a result of imprudence or costs that are unreasonable.

Q So to determine what Edison's cost of debt is authorized in the future, must the Commission determine the prudence of Edison's activities relative to the Thomas and Woolsey fires?

A Well, I need to review what your imbedded cost to debt will be the next time I'm involved in a cost of capital proceeding for PG&E. And in doing that, if there's any specific bond issue where the cost of debt is unreasonable or reflects imprudent costs, then I would make an adjustment and explain what that adjustment is based on.

To the extent I was recommending an adjustment on either of those factors, then I would explain to the Commission why those factors were relevant in adopting my proposed adjustment.

Q So let's clarify my question. The question was not about PG&E. I'm just trying to understand your methodology so that the Commission can evaluate it. In a future cost of capital proceeding -- let me take a step back.

Your recommendation is for PG&E,

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the Commission should compare the actual cost
of debt to what it would have been absent a
bankruptcy and fires that may have been
caused by imprudence; right?

A We've gone back and forth on that

A We've gone back and forth on that several times. My recommendation would be that to the extent there are any amount of interest expense that was increased as a result of imprudence or unreasonable costs should not be included in cost of service for setting rates.

To the extent that the company's cost of debt reflects a higher cost associated with its bankruptcy filing or the wildfire damage costs, then in that proceeding, if I made such an adjustment, I would offer to the Commission and explain why I'm making it and show support for my adjustment.

Q My question is would you recommend that the Commission apply the same methodology to evaluate Edison's cost of debt?

A I think in every rate proceeding the Commission should only include prudent and reasonable cost in the development of the utility's revenue requirement in designing rates for retail customers.

1	So, to the extent any utility's
2	costs include costs that are the result of
3	imprudent management or costs that are
4	unreasonable, I think they should be
5	eliminated from the utility's revenue
6	requirement.
7	Q And specifically to the extent
8	costs of debt are impacted by fire claims
9	costs that may have resulted from imprudence,
10	that should be an adjustment to the cost of
11	debt, that's your position; right?
12	A That very well may be an adjustment
13	that I might propose in the future.
14	Q Has this Commission ever in the
15	past adjusted the utility's cost of debt
16	based on the impact of imprudence on that
17	cost of debt?
18	A I haven't evaluated the
19	Commission's adjustments to cost of debt
20	incentive rates.
21	Q So as far as you know, this would
22	be an unprecedented approach for this
23	Commission?
24	MR. ALCANTAR: Objection as
25	ALJ ALLEN: Sustained, rephrase.
26	BY MR. WEISSMANN:
27	Q Can you cite any precedent for the
28	Commission to adjust the actual cost of debt

based on the impact of imprudence? 1 2. MR. ALCANTAR: Asked and answered. ALJ ALLEN: Overruled. 3 I think the standard for THE WITNESS: 4 setting a rate of return which balances the 5 interest between investors and ratepayers is 6 7 established by the Hope and Bluefield Supreme Court decisions. In that, the rate 8 9 of return should reflect efficient and 10 reasonable management of the utility and 11 produce a rate of return that provides fair 12 compensation and supports just and reasonable 13 rates. 14 I think that would be the standard 15 under which I would recommend any adjustments 16 to the company's embedded debt costs in 17 future rate cases. 18 I'll just move on. 0 19 ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. 2.0 MR. WEISSMANN: Thank you. 21 0 Do you have a recommendation for 22 when this comparison that you suggest would 2.3 end? 2.4 Α Well, it would depend on the facts 25 and circumstances in each of the companies' 26 cost of capital proceedings, but I imagine it 27 would end when there's no reason to believe or no one takes issue with whether or not 2.8

there's costs incumbent, including the 1 company's cost of service, that should be 2. excluded from cost of service on the basis of 3 imprudence or unreasonableness. 4 And how would we know? 5 6 Α You would read parties' testimony 7 in reviewing the company's filing in establishing what is inappropriate to the 8 9 revenue requirement for the utility. 10 0 So that would be a litigated issue? 11 Α It would be a litigated issue. 12 to the extent there are recurring issues, the Commission will rule one way or another and I 13 14 presume that in subsequent rate cases either 15 the utility or the parties would accept that 16 Commission finding. Do you have a recommendation for an 17 outside date, defined end date for this 18 19 comparison? 2.0 Α I think protecting customers is an 21 ongoing obligation of the Commission's. 22 Parties to the case, I think, will advocate 2.3 on behalf of customers and the utility 2.4 investors in all rate cases. 25 You aren't proposing a specific 26 method by which the Commission would conduct 27 this comparison of actual financing costs to

the hypothetical costs; correct?

1 Α Well, I haven't proposed an 2. adjustment at this time, no, but I'm trying to be clear that to the extent the costs are 3 based on imprudent management decisions or 5 the costs are unreasonable, they should be excluded from setting rates. 6 7 But you haven't proposed a specific method to implement that in your testimony 9 here; right? 10 Д Not in this case, no. And would you envision a Commission 11 0 12 decision in this cases establishing such a 13 methodology? 14 Α I would hope the Commission would 15 agree that to the extent parties can 16 demonstrate any costs the company incurs as a 17 result of imprudent management or 18 unreasonable expense, that they would not be 19 included in revenue requirement for setting 2.0 retail customers' rates. 21 And the Commission would implement 22 that in the future? 2.3 I don't think it's a new standard, Α 24 and I believe the Commission would implement 25 that standard going forward as they have in 26 the past. 27 We disagree about whether it's a 2.8 new standard, but let me ask you this: Will

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investors and lenders be concerned about how this methodology will be implemented?

A I believe it is a standard that is used nationwide as far as I'm concerned. And as long as there's clear description of the utility's costs that is found to be either imprudent or unreasonable and excluded from recovery and the Commission acts in a predictable and consistent manner going forward, while the investment community may not like the adjustment, I think they'll understand the principles of setting rates and will act accordingly.

Q Are you saying nationwide every Commission in the country adjusts the actual recorded cost of debt based on a comparison to what that cost would have been had the utility not acted imprudently?

A You keep saying that, but I keep telling you that costs that are either the result of imprudent management decisions or costs that are unreasonable are excluded from being recovered by the utility.

ALJ ALLEN: Mr. Weissmann, I think I understand your line of questioning, trying to establish any questions, I believe I understand the witness' answers in not agreeing with your line of questioning.

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Certainly parties are free to raise this in 1 2. briefs. I don't think you're going to get much farther on this particular approach. Ιf 3 you have other areas you wish to do 4 5 cross-examine on, please do. 6

MR. WEISSMANN: Thank you, your Honor.

Is the manner in which the Commission implements this comparison concept, does that create risks for investors and lenders?

Δ Well, risk for investors relate to both Commission practices and strength of management, so investment risk is a factor that investors will see. Disallowances of costs by the regulatory commissions may trigger responses from investors.

To the extent that investor response means they replace ineffective management with effective management, that investor's risk can be mitigated going forward, but it's part of the process.

Where the balance of interest is preserved and rates are just and reasonable, the utility is provided an opportunity to earn a fair rate of return on prudent and reasonable cost items, and I believe the ratemaking balance is achieved. I think that's a similar balance that every utility

1 is exposed to. 2. So let me clarify a question. not talking about the risks of prudence 3 generically. I'm talking about the way in 4 5 which the Commission would implement your 6 concept of comparing the actual cost of debt 7 to this hypothetical alternative. Does that create risk? 8 9 Α The way the Commission would 10 implement it would approve an overall rate of 11 return that is fair and reasonable, which 12 means it provides fair compensation to the 13 utility and supports just and reasonable 14 That would include a rate of return rates. 15 that does not allow the utility to recover 16 the costs that we've been discussing that are 17 imprudent or unreasonable. 18 We talked before about the debt 19 cost savings that result from the note holder 2.0 RSA; right? 21 Α Yes. 22 And I think you agreed that those 2.3 savings were realized because of the 24 bankruptcy; right? 25 For the ability to -- I haven't 26 confirmed it, but the utility's 27 representation is they could not have

implemented an economic refinancing of those

1	securities absent the bankruptcy. So
2	under if that is accurate then and the
3	bankruptcy did produce savings for those,
4	about \$6.2 billion or high coupon debt.
5	Q And so should PG&E recover the
6	direct costs PG&E necessarily incurred in
7	order to accomplish that outcome?
8	A PG&E should recover reasonable and
9	prudent costs which would include the
10	reasonable and prudent costs of those
11	refinanced high coupon debt instruments.
12	Q Including the fees associated with
13	that refinancing?
14	A To the extent the company can
15	demonstrate that those savings were only
16	gained as a result of costs, then if those
17	costs were reasonable and prudent, then that
18	may be appropriate for consideration.
19	Q Turn to page 25, line 10 of your
20	testimony.
21	A I'm there.
22	Q And you're speaking here about a
23	pay-down of the temporary utility debt?
24	A Yes.
25	Q To protect the utility's financial
26	integrity; right?
27	A Correct.
28	Q And you understand that the

company's plan is to use the cash flow from 1 2. the net operating losses to pay down the temporary utility debt if securitization is 3 not approved? 4 That is my understanding, yes, with 5 6 the clear-stated intent that the cost of that 7 debt will not be included in revenue requirement and that the debt service will be 8 9 paid for through those tax savings. 10 O And do you oppose that plan? Okay. 11 Α I have not opposed that, but I have 12 requested or recommended the Commission that they ask for some transparency to ensure that 13 14 that intent is followed through and the 15 financial integrity of the utility is 16 restored as quickly as possible because this 17 debt that is issued that is not used to 18 invest in utility plant and equipment 19 increases the overall leverage of the 2.0 utility, it erodes the company's credit 21 metrics. The faster that debt is paid off, 22 the faster those credit metrics will recover. 2.3 So, paying on the debt Q Right. 24 reduces leverage; right? 25 Α Yes. And that's a beneficial outcome? 26 0 27 Α It is a beneficial outcome to both 2.8 ratepayers and investors.

1	Q Right. Okay. So, regardless of
2	securitization, PG&E will use the net
3	operating losses to pay down the temporary
4	utility debts, so those net operating losses
5	are an asset of the company; correct?
6	A Yeah, they will use them to reduce
7	the amount of income tax they will ultimately
8	pay to government tax authorities, yes.
9	Q So it's a shareholder asset?
10	A The shareholders incurred the loss,
11	the write-off, and they are entitled to the
12	full benefit of the taxes except for their
13	obligation to pay off this temporary utility
14	debt.
15	Q Right. So just from an economic
16	point of view, we look at PG&E, these net
17	operating losses are not on the balance
18	sheet; correct?
19	A Well, I will confirm that they're
20	recording at the corp level, but I'll accept
21	that subject to check.
22	Q But they do have economic value;
23	correct?
24	A The NOL asset?
25	Q Yes.
26	A Yes.
27	Q Okay. And lenders would recognize
28	it as such; correct?

It will strengthen the utility's 1 Α 2. cash flows over time, yes. Okay. Please take a look at 3 Q page 25 of your testimony. 4 I'm there. 5 Α 6 0 Here we're onto my favorite topic 7 of capital structure. Okay. I understand here that you agree with the company about 8 9 the principle that the purpose of ratemaking 10 capital structure is to accurately reflect 11 the proportion of equity and debt used to 12 finance rate base; correct? I think it's more complicated than 13 14 that, but I think the company's intent in 15 their filing and the restructuring plan is 16 that the ratemaking capital structure will 17 reflect the capital used to support 18 investment utility plant and equipment, and 19 that temporary debt would be -- I didn't 2.0 specifically say this -- but their 21 projections indicate that they're going to 22 pay it off as quickly as possible. In this case I believe that's a 2.3 reasonable objective. 24 The reason I want to 25 limit it to this case is because there can be 26 other cases where the utility is owned by a 27 parent company that uses what's generally

referred to as a double leverage kind of

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The parent company issues a lot of 1 standard. 2. debt to make equity infusions in the utility, fattens up the utility's equity ratio, but 3 the current ratings still of the utility company do not reflect that mix of debt and 5 6 equity in the cap structure, so it can be 7 more complicated. So, this testimony reflects what PG&E's restructured plan 8 9 suggests in this case. 10

Q Okay. For purposes of this case, you would agree that the ratemaking capital structure should reflect the proportion of equity and debt used to finance PG&E's rate base?

A I think it should and I think that commitment by the company should be part of the conditions under which their restructuring plan is adopted with commitments and the intent is verifiable that the debt-supporting investments other than rate-base investment will be paid off as quickly as possible.

Q Right. Okay. Now I'd like to direct your attention to page 25, line 19 through page 26, line two.

A I'm there.

Q Here you're referring to the issuance 6.75 billion of stock that will be

paid to the fire victim trust; correct? 1 2. Α Yes. And this is the only area that you 3 indicate a potential disagreement with the 4 5 company's proposal for adjustment of the 6 capital structure; right? 7 Α I don't know if it's a disagreement or a need for clarification by the company's 8 9 filing. 10 0 Okay. But that's the only one; 11 right? 12 Well, there was two aspects of the 13 common equity bill as to the ratemaking 14 capital structure. The first one is if they 15 do use equity capital to make contributions 16 to the trust, then that would be capital that 17 would be used to support rate-based 18 investments. 19 The second one is reversing 2.0 write-offs per contributions to the trust who 21 are paying for wildfire damage claims and 22 measuring the amount of equity that was -- if 2.3 those are non-cash write-offs, measuring the 24 amount of equity that was actually used to 25 invest in the utility plant and equipment. 26 With respect to the \$6.75 billion, 27 it does appear to be equity issues at parent 28 company level. It may or may not have

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implications at the capital utility level, but to the extent it does, then that should be considered in forming the appropriate utility ratemaking cap structure.

With respect to the write-offs of contributions in the trust or wildfire victim funds, to the extent it's non-cash write-off and it's funded by other vehicles such as the temporary utility debt, if the utility follows through with paying off that debt as quickly as possible, then I wouldn't oppose reversing those write-offs.

But there's a verifiable commitment by the utility to write -- to pay off that temporary debt as quickly as possible and to retain equity in the utility company to kind of build it back up to replenish the amount of common equity actually available to invest in utility plant and equipment.

Q I think we're in agreement, but that was kind of a long answer so let me try to break it down and make sure I understand. So let's start with the 6.75 billion of stock. As you say, that's issued by the parent company; correct?

A It was noted as a parent -- it's issue of public stock, so it would be the parent company, yes.

Right. And it's paid directly to 1 0 the fire victim trust; correct? 2. А Correct. 3 So it's never going down into the 4 0 utility; right? 5 Well, the parent company makes 6 Α 7 equity or capital contributions to the utility so I wouldn't think it would somehow 8 9 work its way into those contributions, but I 10 haven't really looked at that in detail. 11 0 Would or would not? I didn't hear 12 you. I would think it would not impact 13 Α 14 equity --15 Q Okay. 16 -- capital contributions from Α 17 parent of the utility, but I haven't had the 18 time to really review what those capital 19 contributions between the parent company and 2.0 the utility company will be. Okay. So let's just assume for 21 0 22 purposes of my question that the stock is 2.3 paid directly from the parent to the trust, 24 never goes through the utility. Do you have 25 that assumption in mind? 26 Α I do. 27 So then the consequence of that 0 2.8 payment is that the liability on the

utility's balance sheet associated with the
claims would be extinguished; correct?
A I haven't confirmed that, but I
would presume it would be.
Q Actually let me take a step back.
PG&E has taken non-cash charges associated
with the fire claims; correct?
A I haven't reviewed all the
accounting of it, yes, but it's my
understanding that those are some of the
transactions that will be recorded.
Q Or have been?
A I haven't confirmed that.
Q When PG&E takes a charge, a
non-cash charge, that creates a liability on
the balance sheet; right?
A It does.
Q Okay. And the charm, again, is
associated with the contingent obligation to
pay claims; correct?
A Can we go back. I mean, if they
record a charge and it hasn't yet been paid?
Q Right.
A I mean, they can it would record
it against common equity on the liability
side.
Q Right.

1	the assets really wouldn't change.
2	Q Precisely.
3	A The cash is still on the utility's
4	balance sheet.
5	Q That's what we mean by a non-cash
6	charge; right?
7	A Yeah, but I didn't agree
8	specifically with a recording of a liability
9	as you described. That's what I was trying
10	to make sure I was on the same page with you
11	on.
12	Q So the charge this non-cash
13	charge associated with the contingent
14	obligation to pay the claims reduces common
15	equity; correct?
16	A Through recording of the operating
17	income statement, reduce retained earnings,
18	yes.
19	Q Yes. Okay. And then once the
20	claims are paid as part of the plan, that
21	extinguishes the charge; correct?
22	A Well, it would, yes.
23	Q Yes. So, therefore, the equity is
24	restored to where it was before the charges
25	were taken; right?
26	A Well, cash would go down on the
27	utility's balance sheet so the asset side
28	would be impacted by the payment of the

The liability side would also have to 1 claim. 2. be adjusted to reflect the shrinking of the 3 assets. Depends who pays the claims. 4 0 Ιf 5 the parent pays the claim, that's not the 6 case? 7 And depending on whether or not the utility -- I haven't looked at the accounting 8 9 for this. 10 Q Okay. 11 Α So, I mean, there is a possibility 12 that the common equity could be restored in 13 the manner you're describing, but I have not 14 verified that based on the company's 15 accounting records. 16 Okay. So let me make it clear. 17 Except for the \$6 billion of temporary 18 utility debt, which is being taken out at the 19 utility level, you agree that that amount 2.0 should be removed from the ratemaking capital 21 structure assuming that there's a plan to pay 22 it down properly; correct? 2.3 If there's a verifiable plan to pay Α 24 it off on an accelerated basis, yes. 25 Okay. Are you recommending that 26 the Commission not approve PG&E's plan? 27 I'm recommending that the company's

plan should be modified with certain

contingent adjustments. 1 2. That's as much as I've recommended; that certain aspects of the plan need to have 3 certain commitments from the utility, including verifiable objectives with metrics 5 6 to measure the utility's actual efforts to 7 actually achieve the financial measurements in their plan and ensure that rates are just 9 and reasonable; that costs that shouldn't be 10 paid by customers aren't paid by customers; 11 and that if the Commission that does approve 12 the plans for certain commitments, further 13 commitments, the utility should make in 14 receiving that approval. 15 Subject to those recommendations 16 for additional conditions, are you 17 recommending that the Commission find that 18 the plan complies with AB-1054? 19 I don't know if I've gone that far. 2.0 I think that will be a position that will be 21 advocated by TURN and EPUC and IS. 22 testimony simply outlines improvements to the 2.3 plan necessary to ensure that customers are 24 protected under the plan. 25 0 Thank you. 26 That's all I have, your Honor. 27 Thank you, Mr. Weissmann. ALJ ALLEN:

Mr. Bloom.

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1	MR. BLOOM: Thank you, your Honor.
2	CROSS-EXAMINATION
3	BY MR. BLOOM:
4	Q Mr. Gorman, I'm Jerry Bloom, and
5	I'm here on behalf of the Tort Claimants
6	Committee.
7	A Good afternoon.
8	Q On page two of your testimony, you
9	state that:
10	The need to focus on the
11	conditions that may exist
12	at the moment PG&E emerges
13	from bankruptcy but also
14	will need to take actions
15	to sustain, oversee, audit,
16	and support the ongoing
17	interests of ratepayers.
18	Is that correct?
19	A It is.
20	Q And this place actually is just the
21	last line of questions that you were just
22	discussing with Mr. Weissmann.
23	We have before us two different
24	time periods. There's, if you will, a
25	snapshot that I discussed as well with
26	Mr. Beach this morning where the Commission
27	needs to make a determination in order to
28	reach the goals of 1054 to have the company

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emerge from bankruptcy by the summer and get into the wildfire insurance claim and so forth. There's necessarily a snapshot that has to be taken as to the conditions and what's been presented in the plan at this point; is that correct?

A Generally I agree.

Q Okay. And over the longer term, then we'll be looking at -- and this is what you recalled on as you just said in your last answer -- a number of metrics and other things that may, as the plan develops, as the restructuring plan gets introduced, developed and introduced at the Commission, the cost of capital proceeding, things we've been talking about today, as those things happen, there may be adjustments or things that need to be made post-approval of the plan and emergence from bankruptcy?

A Yes, there needs to be part of the plan that achieves certain performance by the utility including strengthening its financial position and insuring the customer and doing so without asking questions to pay costs that they shouldn't be asked to pay.

Q You also state in your testimony that the interest that you alluded to, the ongoing interest to ratepayers includes

statutory protections for ratepayers; is that 1 2. correct? Α 3 Yes. In your testimony, you appear to 4 0 5 focus heavily on the rates themselves, which 6 is certainly of interest to ratepayers. 7 Would you agree that reliability and safety are also of interest to ratepayers? 9 Α Absolutely. You know, when I focus 10 on rates, I'm talking about service, quality, 11 and reliability as well as safety to 12 employees and the public. And would you agree that the fire 13 14 victims are also similarly situated 15 ratepayers with interest not only in rates, 16 but also and particularly in reliability and 17 safety? 18 А I can't speak for them, but I would 19 presume that that's an accurate statement. 2.0 I'd like to focus on two of 0 Okav. 21 your recommendations. The eighth 22 recommendation that you set forth on page six, you state: 2.3 24 The plan of reorganization 25 does not include concrete 26 standards or obligations to 27 allow the Commission to review whether PG&E is 2.8

implementing the plan as 1 2. intended. Is that correct? 3 Α Yes. 4 5 And asking you in terms of, again, 6 these timing issues is what's before the 7 Commission and how this would go forward, you talk about specific terms, standards, 9 expectations, and obligations. 10 Can you give us an idea or clarify when would that occur? How will those things 11 12 be developed and at what point would they be 13 developed? 14 Α I think we'll know over time. 15 mean, certainly a plan that is designed to 16 maintain just and reasonable rates to 17 customers while providing the utility the 18 ability to improve its financial standing, it 19 is -- it is certainly a primary objective of 2.0 this proceeding and presumably the next rate 21 case, ensuring that the utility is able to 22 meet its obligations for all the settlement 2.3 of wildfire damage claim costs. 24 Q So --25 Α And ensure that the utility is able 26 to modify operations to manage the risk of 27 operations including wildfire risk in a way

that protects the public and ensures that the

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utility minimizes its risk of repeating these events.

Q Picking up on the beginning of your answer to that last question, these, again, will be things that will be developed over time. They're not necessarily things that are or can be introduced at this point.

Again, we're taking a snapshot. But over time, as you just said, we're going to be developing a number of these things that need to come into consideration?

A I think the general outlooks for what we want to achieve can be identified, but the actual mechanisms that will allow us to achieve those in a way that protects customers and the utility is something we'd have to work through.

Q Okay. And, again, the purpose of this would be, and would you accept to allow for, if you will, course corrections, changes that may surface as we go over time to ensure that we don't end up with not only unacceptable levels of rates but certainly safe and reliable service coming from the utility?

A I think that's generally the same question. I think that's kind of all part of the expectations going forward.

Your fifth recommendation, which 1 0 2. you have also on page 4 you address 3 governance issues and the need for autonomy and security for the utility; is that 4 5 correct? 6 Α Yes. 7 And then on page 28, you go into 0 some detail regarding the autonomy and the 9 Board of Governors who point out the need for 10 independence of that Board? 11 For the utility Board not the 12 corporate Board, yes. And can you tell me have you made 13 14 any specific recommendations of how you achieve that independence? 15 16 Are there for example different 17 people on the two boards? Or does -- are you 18 including in your testimony a specific 19 recommendation that you want to see? 2.0 Α I have not in this testimony. 21 generally separation of the utility from the 22 parent company is a structure that has some 2.3 experience throughout the industry. Credit 24 rating agencies do provide some insight into 25 what can help isolate the utility's credit 26 standing from erosion of credit standing at the corporate level. And I think there is 27

significant industry experience that

established some of those guidelines for an 1 2. appropriate brief and separation between the 3 utility and the parent company. So is your testimony today and what 4 we gather from our earlier discussion this 5 6 also in that same category of things over 7 time that may change or adjustments or different criteria may be introduced in terms 9 of what we experience as we implement the 10 plan and implement the various 11 recommendations that the utility has made in 12 the moving us forward to reach a 13 confirmation? 14 Α I think that is one aspect of the 15 plan that can add additional customer 16 protections with the utility company. 17 proper separation of the Board of Directors 18 from the utility from the parent company with 19 the ability to make independent 2.0 determinations in utility capital investment 21 plan. And requirement to pay dividends to 22 the parent company would include certain 2.3 concessions the Commission may ask the 24 utility to agree to in approval of the plan. 25 Thank you, your Honor. MR. BLOOM: 26 have no further questions. 27 Thank you, Mr. Bloom. ALJ ALLEN: 2.8 Any other cross for Mr. Gorman?

1	Mr. Abrams, one question?
2	MR. ABRAMS: One question.
3	ALJ ALLEN: Go right ahead.
4	CROSS-EXAMINATION
5	BY MR. ABRAMS:
6	Q Mr. Gorman, would you say that
7	bankruptcy in the time of bankruptcy provides
8	a unique opportunity for restructuring
9	financials for the public good?
10	A Depending on the circumstances
11	which lead to the bankruptcy filing, it can.
12	To the extent that replacement of the
13	significant level of the executives in the
14	utility was part of that bankruptcy filing,
15	then it's a possibility.
16	Q Thank you.
17	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
18	Is there any redirect?
19	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
20	BY MR. ALCANTAR:
21	Q Yes, your Honor. Very briefly as
22	to one question, one area.
23	You were asked, Mr. Gorman, to
24	refer to Mr. Wells' testimony at PG&E
25	Exhibit-01, pages 228 and 229.
26	A Yes.
27	Q Do you recall that testimony?
28	A I do.

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Q You were characterized as having made an error in your testimony. Can you explain to the Commission what relevance that oversight with respect to these figures has with regard to your observations or conclusions recommended in your testimony?

A Well, the observation related to

A Well, the observation related to whether or not there was verifiable interest rate savings created by the bankruptcy as observing that there were other debt instruments that interest rates may have changes as a result of the bankruptcy or as the erosion of credit standing of the utility company.

And while the RSA did allow for refinancing with some high coupon debt, it also allowed for the reinstatement of existing utility debt and where a provision of the reorganization plan states that those bondholders would be made whole for damages from the bankruptcy filing.

So it wasn't clear to me whether or not the interest rates on those bonds would be higher because of the bankruptcy than they would have been without the bankruptcy. So that was the point I was trying to make.

And while I did miss the interest rate notes by Mr. Wells in his testimony, it

still isn't clear to me that those interest 1 2. rates are not higher as a result of the 3 bankruptcy or restructuring plan than they might have been available absent the 4 bankruptcy plan. 5 6 I appreciate it. One last 7 question. Can you tell me what the answer is to "so what"? So what there's an oversight 8 9 here. What does it mean to your position? 10 Α It means that I have not changed my 11 position that the company has not proven that 12 there are net interest rate savings as a 13 result of bankruptcy. 14 MR. ALCANTAR: Thank you, your Honor. 15 Nothing further. 16 ALJ ALLEN: Any recross. 17 (No response.) 18 Thank you, Mr. Gorman. ALJ ALLEN: You 19 are excused. 2.0 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 21 ALJ ALLEN: The next witness is 22 Mr. Long; is that correct? 2.3 MR. FINKELSTEIN: That is correct, your 2.4 Honor. 25 ALJ ALLEN: Go ahead and call Mr. Long. 26 MR. FINKELSTEIN: While that's 27 happening, your Honor, may I move the 2.8 admission of a few documents, or do you want

1	to do that
2	ALJ ALLEN: Hold on a second.
3	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Okay.
4	ALJ ALLEN: TURN calls Thomas Long.
5	Off the record.
6	(Off the record.)
7	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
8	Mr. Alcantar?
9	MR. ALCANTAR: Thank you, your Honor.
10	At this time pursuant to an appreciated
11	stipulation from counsel for PG&E, we would
12	move into the record the exhibits previously
13	marked as EPUC-01, EPUC-1-C; is that correct?
14	ALJ ALLEN: 1-AC.
15	MR. ALCANTAR: Thank you. 1-AC,
16	EPUC-02, and EPUC-02-C.
17	And in addition to those EPUC
18	documents, we would move the admission of
19	Mr. Gorman's testimony previously identified
20	as TURN-EPUC-IS-02.
21	ALJ ALLEN: Is there any objection to
22	the receipt of those exhibits?
23	(No response.)
24	ALJ ALLEN: Seeing none, those exhibits
25	are received.
26	(Exhibit No. EPUC-01 was received into evidence.)
27	(Exhibit No. EPUC-01-AC was received
28	into evidence.)

1	(Exhibit No. EPUC-02 was received into evidence.)
2	(Exhibit No. EPUC-02-C was received
3	into evidence.)
4	(Exhibit No. TURN-EPUC-IS-02 was received into evidence.)
5	received into evidence.
6	ALJ ALLEN: Off the record.
7	(Off the record.)
8	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
9	THOMAS LONG, called as a witness by
10	TURN, having been sworn, testified as follows:
11	THE WITNESS: I do.
12	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. Please be
13	seated, state your whole name, and spell your
14	last name for the record.
15	Mr. Finkelstein, are you presenting
16	this witness?
17	THE WITNESS: My name is Thomas Long,
18	L-o-n-g.
19	DIRECT EXAMINATION
20	BY MR. FINKELSTEIN:
21	Q Good afternoon, Mr. Long.
22	A Good afternoon.
23	Q Do you have before you what has
24	been marked as TURN-01, which is your
25	prepared reply testimony?
26	A Yes, I have that.
27	Q And do you have also before you
28	what's been marked TURN-01-E, which is the

1	errata to your prepared testimony?
2	ALJ ALLEN: I think we haven't marked
3	that on the record yet.
4	MR. FINKELSTEIN: I'm sorry, your
5	Honor. Can we mark on the record TURN-01-E
6	and TURN-02, please?
7	ALJ ALLEN: Sure. I have in front of
8	me The Errata to Prepared Reply Testimony of
9	Thomas Long. That will be marked as
10	TURN-01-E.
11	(Exhibit No. TURN-01-E was marked for identification.)
12	ror identification.)
13	ALJ ALLEN: I have TURN Exhibit TURN
14	Responses to PG&E Data Request 2-7 and 3.
15	That will be marked as TURN-02.
16	(Exhibit No. TURN-02 was marked for identification.)
17	146116111164616111,
18	ALJ ALLEN: Go ahead.
19	BY MR. FINKELSTEIN:
20	Q So, Mr. Long, do you still have
21	before you what's been marked as TURN-01-E,
22	your errata?
23	A Yes, I have that.
24	Q And that's errata to your prepared
25	reply testimony?
26	A That's correct.
27	Q And do you have before you what's
28	been marked as TURN-02, which are responses

1	to PG&E's data request?
2	A I have that.
3	Q Were those materials prepared by
4	you or under your direction?
5	A Yes, they were.
6	Q To the extent they make factual
7	assertions, are they true and correct to the
8	best of your knowledge?
9	A Yes.
10	Q To the extent they recommend
11	policies, do they reflect your best judgment
12	on these matters?
13	A Yes, they do.
14	Q Do you have any other corrections
15	to make to your testimony?
16	A I do not.
16 17	A I do not. MR. FINKELSTEIN: Mr. Long's available
17	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Mr. Long's available
17 18	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Mr. Long's available for cross.
17 18 19	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Mr. Long's available for cross. ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
17 18 19 20	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Mr. Long's available for cross. ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. Mr. Rutten, are you doing cross on
17 18 19 20 21	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Mr. Long's available for cross. ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. Mr. Rutten, are you doing cross on this witness?
17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Mr. Long's available for cross. ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. Mr. Rutten, are you doing cross on this witness? CROSS-EXAMINATION
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Mr. Long's available for cross. ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. Mr. Rutten, are you doing cross on this witness? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. RUTTEN:
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Mr. Long's available for cross. ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. Mr. Rutten, are you doing cross on this witness? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. RUTTEN: Q I am, your Honor.
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Mr. Long's available for cross. ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. Mr. Rutten, are you doing cross on this witness? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. RUTTEN: Q I am, your Honor. Good afternoon, Mr. Long.

1	compensation. In your testimony, you offer a			
2	number of opinions about the proper design of			
3	PG&E's Executive Compensation Programs;			
4	correct?			
5	A Yes.			
6	Q Have you ever worked for a company			
7	where you have responsibility of designing			
8	that company's Executive Compensation			
9	Program?			
10	A I have not.			
11	Q Have you published any			
12	peer-reviewed articles on the subject of			
13	proper executive compensation design?			
14	A I have not.			
15	Q Do you hold a degree in industrial			
16	relations?			
17	A I do not.			
18	Q Do you hold a degree in human			
19	resources management?			
20	A I do not.			
21	Q You would agree with me that it is			
22	important for PG&E to mitigate the risk of			
23	catastrophic wildfires?			
24	A Yes, I certainly would.			
25	Q And you understand that Public			
26	Safety Power Shutoffs, or PSPS, is one way of			
27	mitigating that risk?			
28	A Yes. But there are also offsetting			

risks that the shutoffs themselves pose. 1 2. 0 So PSPS can itself create separate risks? 3 4 Α Exactly. So there can be risks associated 5 0 6 with not implementing the PSPS. And there 7 can be risks associated with implementing the PSPS; fair? 8 9 Α Yes. 10 So would you agree the decision 11 whether to implement the PSPS is a serious decision? 12 It's a serious decision. 13 А I agree. 14 Would you agree that that decision 15 should be made to the extent possible based 16 on objective criteria such as for example weather conditions? 17 18 А It should be made on based on a lot 19 of -- many considerations. And there are 2.0 others in my organization who have been 21 focused on that in the deenergization docket. 22 But I would generally agree with your 2.3 statement. 24 Certainly you would agree injecting 25 someone's personal financial motivations into 26 the decision of whether to implement the PSPS 27 would be a bad idea? I think the decision to -- whether 2.8 Α

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or not to implement PSPS in the scope should 1 not be based on financial considerations. 2. In your testimony -- and I'll be 3 Q looking at page 32. It should be in Tab 1 of 4 5 the binder that we set up there for you as a In your testimony, you propose a 6 resource. 7 incentive compensation performance metric called "Customer Hours of PSPS Shutoffs Per 8 9 High Fire Threat District Miles." Is that 10 correct? 11 А Yes. And we also spoke to that in 12 one of our data request responses. 13 Let's look at those data responses, 14 which I believe were just marked as TURN-02. 15 And I'd like focus you on pages 3 and 4 where 16 we can find that discussion. If it's 17 helpful, that's in your binder up there at 18 Tab 2. 19 I have it. Α And on page 3, this metric 2.0 Okay. 0 called Customer Hours of PSPS Shutoffs Per 21 22 High Fire Threat District Mile, that is defined as the number of customer hours of 2.3 24 deenergization due to PSPS; correct? 25 That's the general definition. 26 Although the actual specific calculation is 27 shown in the row below that.

The general definition as I just

1	phrased it tracks with what's in TURN's data
2	response?
3	A Yes.
4	Q Looking above that, the paragraph
5	that begins with the word "response." It
6	says quote:
7	As stated on page 32, lines
8	3 to 4, of Mr. Long's reply
9	testimony, the purpose of
10	this metric is to
11	incentivize a reduction in
12	the frequency, scope, and
13	duration of PSPS events.
14	Which is the same goal that
15	PG&E identified for its
16	proposed substation
17	enablement metric.
18	Did I accurately read TURN's text
19	there?
20	A Yes, that's accurate.
21	Q Okay. And as a citation for that,
22	it goes on to cite Mr. Lowe's testimony.
23	Page 7-17 do you see that?
24	A Yes.
25	Q Mr. Lowe's testimony is up there
26	with you in Tab 3 of the binder we provided.
27	Let me ask you to look at page 7-17, please.
28	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Your Honor, if we

1 could have a minute to literally get on the 2. same page. 3 ALJ ALLEN: I'm sure Mr. Long will let us know when he's ready. 4 I was less worried 5 MR. FINKELSTEIN: 6 about Mr. Long, your Honor. 7 I've got it. Thank you. THE WITNESS: I'm at page 7-17. 9 ALJ ALLEN: Mr. Finkelstein? 10 MR. FINKELSTEIN: I'm there, your 11 Honor. BY MR. RUTTEN: 12 13 Can you please show us where on 14 page 7-17 or anywhere in Mr. Lowe's testimony 15 where he says the purpose of PG&E's 16 substation enablement metric is to 17 incentivize a reduction in the frequency of a 18 PSPS. 19 Α In that paragraph on that page, I 2.0 do not see the word "frequency." 21 However, I did see that in numerous 22 places in PG&E's testimony elsewhere. That 2.3 PG&E is striving and takes very seriously its 24 desire to reduce not just the scope but the 25 frequency of PSPS events. 26 Do you see anything in Mr. Lowe's 27 testimony or can you point to anything in any 2.8 PG&E testimony that says the purpose of the

substation enablement metric is to reduce the 1 2 frequency of PSPS? I don't see it in this paragraph. 3 And, you know, I don't have the time now to 4 5 scope through every word of his testimony. 6 But I don't see it in this particular 7 paragraph that you point me to. Can you point us to anything in 8 9 Mr. Lowe's testimony or elsewhere in PG&E's 10 testimony saying that PG&E is trying to 11 inject personal financial motivations into the decision of implementing PSPS? 12 13 Α Could you repeat that question? 14 Can you point us to anything 0 15 in Mr. Lowe's testimony or elsewhere in 16 PG&E's testimony saying that PG&E is trying to inject personal financial motivations into 17 18 the decision of whether to implement a PSPS 19 event? 2.0 I don't think that was the nature 21 of my concerns about the way the PG&E 22 structured its Incentive Compensation 2.3 Program. So I don't think you'll find that 24 in my testimony. 25 So you can't point us to anything 26 in PG&E's testimony; is that fair? 27 If you're talking just about the substation enablement metric? Is that what 2.8

your question pertains to? 1 2. My question was actually a little 3 broader. I'll ask it again. The question Can you point us to anything in PG&E's 4 5 testimony saying that PG&E is trying to 6 inject personal financial motivations into 7 the decision of whether to call a PSPS event? No. I'm sure PG&E would not say Α 9 that's what they're trying to do. So I don't think I would find that. 10 Let's talk about the situation in 11 12 which incentive compensation is otherwise payable to PG&E may be denied. 13 14 understand that it described in Mr. Lowe's 15 testimony the Board and the Compensation 16 Committee have discretion to reduce or 17 eliminate incentive compensation awards if 18 the totality of the circumstances they 19 believe that would be appropriate. You 2.0 understand that's the case? 21 I understand that. I believe the А 22 phrase that was used was "as the Board sees fit." 2.3 24 Are you aware that the Board has in 25 fact reduced incentive compensation in prior 26 years? 27 I saw a reference to that in PG&E's 2.8 testimony. I don't know for a fact myself.

1	But I saw a reference to that.
2	Q Are you aware that the Board
3	reduced the award to zero for the year 2018?
4	A I heard that. I don't know that
5	personally, but I've heard that.
6	Q Are you aware that the Board
7	reduced the incentive compensation following
8	the San Bruno tragedy?
9	A I do not know one way or the other.
10	Q Let me ask you to look at page 36
11	of your testimony, please. I'd like to focus
12	you on line 26. Tell me when you're there.
13	A I'm there.
14	Q In the middle of the sentence it
15	says:
16	TURN recommends that most
17	or all of PG&E's otherwise
18	payable incentive
19	compensation be eliminated
20	in the event of
21	catastrophic wildfire
22	defined as a fire involving
23	one or more fatalities.
24	And then it goes on from there. Do
25	you see that?
26	A Right. It includes "or a
27	catastrophic accident" as well.
28	Q I want focus on the fire aspect of

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that. That's TURN's recommendation in this 1 2. proceeding? It is a recommendation. And it is 3 Α further elaborated upon in my data request 4 5 responses. 6 0 Under TURN's proposal of it's 7 recommendation, would the elimination of most or all incentive compensation in the event of 8 9 a catastrophic wildfire be automatic or would 10 it be subject to discretion? 11 Α If I could take a moment and find 12 the data request response where we elaborate on this proposal, I think I can speak to that 13 14 question. 15 I located my data request Okay. 16 Would you mind repeating the response. 17 question? 18 Q Under TURN's proposal that I Sure. 19 read from your testimony for elimination of 2.0 most or all incentive compensation in the 21 case of a catastrophic wildfire defined as 22 having one or more fatalities, would the 2.3 elimination of that compensation be automatic or subject to discretion? 24 25 If you'll allow me to just preface 26 my response. I do intend to answer that 27 But I want to preface it by saying question.

that TURN's recommendation on executive

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compensation is first and foremost that PG&E should put in a revised proposal that takes into account the concerns that TURN has raised.

And we're hoping the Commission will in its order in this proceeding direct PG&E to address some of those concerns or all of our concerns actually.

And one of those concerns is the standard list discretion that PG&E is giving itself for reduction or elimination of executive compensation. So our proposal, as elaborated upon as a suggestion to the PG&E in this revised proposal, it's not a definitive proposal by TURN but a suggestion to PG&E, is that PG&E withhold 50 percent of the executive compensation in the event that PG&E causes one of the events that I mentioned in my testimony: A catastrophic wildfire or a catastrophic explosion of its -- on its gas lines.

And that PG&E have discretion based on identified criteria to withhold more than that. So that's -- that I hope is responsive to your question.

Q It is. Thank you. Let me try to rephrase to make sure I understand. So first of all I understand that TURN's

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recommendation are you saying that it has evolved from the time of your testimony on February 21st to the time of the data responses on February 28th?

A In response to PG&E's question, we endeavor to try to give PG&E more guidance about what we're looking for. So the recommendation is the same. But we've given PG&E more details about what we're looking for in a program that would have -- do a better job of bounding the discretion of the PG&E Board.

Q So as I understand the proposal -excuse me. If I understand correctly the
proposal as it currently stands based on your
testimony, 50 percent of the incentive
compensation would be automatically denied in
the event of a catastrophic wildfire? Is
that fair?

A Well, automatic is a determination

-- PG&E would make a determination whether it
had caused a catastrophic wildfire that leads
to one or more deaths or a gas explosion that
leads to one or more deaths. PG&E would make
a determination. And that determination
would be made. And PG&E would then -- I
don't think I'd use the word "automatic."

But PG&E would then at a minimum reduce the

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otherwise payable incentive award by 50 percent.

If circumstances changed and PG&E learned more, for example found that it did not in fact cause one of those events, then PG&E would have a chance to revise that determination.

Q Let me ask this by way of examples to see if I can understand. Let's say the PG&E equipment ignites a wildfire that results in a fatality because a car slammed into a pole and knocked it over, and so PG&E equipment's sparking.

Under TURN's recommendation in that situation, would the executives lose at least 50 percent of their incentive compensation?

A I think whether or not PG&E was the cause would depend on circumstances. So if it was a well placed pole that was well maintained and PG&E's operation of the pole or PG&E's maintenance of the pole, placement of the pole et cetera, had absolutely nothing to do with the cause of the wildfire, then I would not attribute the cause to PG&E. I would say the cause there was the vehicle running into the pole. So I would not call that a PG&E-caused event.

Q So even though these sparks came

from PG&E's equipment, that is not a 1 2. situation where executives would lose their 3 incentive compensation? I wouldn't suggest that happen in 4 5 that case. But you may be getting -- you may 6 be getting to what happens if a limb blows 7 into a line and causes a spark. In that instance, I would say PG&E facilities did 9 cause the wildfire, and that should be considered a PG&E-caused event. 10 11 And in that situation, executives 12 would lose at least 50 percent of their incentive compensation under TURN's proposal? 13 14 Α Yes. 15 What if the limb blows from 50 feet 0 16 away? 17 Α Same. 18 Same. What if PG&E could have 0 19 called a PSPS but did not, and the limb blows 2.0 into the live line, the fire starts, same? Executive lose half their incentive 21 22 compensation? 2.3 They would lose at least half. Α And 2.4 then there would be criteria that we're 25 encouraging PG&E to develop to determine whether there should be additional 26 27 withholding of incentive-based compensation. 2.8 Q Let me give you a different

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example. Let's say a piece of PG&E equipment fails for reasons that have nothing to do with negligence or violation of law on PG&E's part. Let's just say it's a brand new piece of equipment and a latent manufacturing defect no one could have known about. Fire starts and there's a fatality. Under TURN's proposal, would PG&E executives lose at least half of their incentive compensation?

A PG&E's responsible for that equipment. I've never heard of anything like what you're talking about happening in any of the catastrophic events that we've seen in California in PG&E's service territory. But I would say PG&E's responsible for making sure that its equipment is up to the job.

Q Are you aware of any articles or studies or literature that discusses the effect on a company's ability to recruit if employees can lose their incentive compensation for reasons that are out of their control?

A I'm not aware of anything specifically to that, but my concern is that PG&E has a program where it just says, we can do it based on anything that we see fit. We can withhold anything we think is a good reason to withhold.

And if I were an employee, subject 1 2. to that regime, I would be a little bit concerned about not knowing the basis for 3 PG&E making that decision, and I would think that would have a problem, that would cause a 5 problem for recruiting and retaining talent. 6 7 So you're concerned that PG&E's incentive compensation programs, as described 8 9 in the testimony of Mr. Lowe, give too much 10 discretion to the board that might hurt 11 PG&E's ability to recruit? It's not that there's -- the 12 problem is, and I state this in my testimony 13 14 that the discretion is not bounded and there 15 is no criteria given, and the statute says 16 that the metrics that are to be used to 17 determine incentive compensation are to be 18 measurable and enforceable. 19 There's nothing in a as-we-see-fit 2.0 standard that this Commission or the Wildfire 21 Safety Division, if it has the 22 responsibility, can enforce against. 2.3 PG&E can decide, after an event 2.4 like the Camp Fire, that it doesn't see a 25 reason to withhold any executive 26 compensation. There's nothing in a 27 as-we-see-fit standard that the Commission

could enforce in that instance.

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Q Are you expressing a concern, Mr. Long, for PG&E's executives?

A I think executive compensation is extremely important. We've devoted a lot of attention to it, not just to PG&E, but to the other utilities because we think it can be a way of focusing behavior on what matters with respect to safety.

So that's the concern is that we have executives that are focused on safety and making the company as safe as possible.

Q Let me ask you about the issue of discretion. I understand your position that you think there should be some bounds around that, and as I understand it, you're saying that in the event of a PG&E-caused wildfire involving a fatality, executives would lose at least half their compensation, and the other half would potentially be lost subject to discretion. Is that what --

A Subject to discretion, but based on stated criteria; akin to what the Commission does. The Commission has criteria that it sets forth for determining a penalty amount, but there's discretion. But there's criteria that show how the discretion will be exercised instead of "as we see fit."

Q You have the data responses in

1	front of you that might be helpful.
2	Looking at page 7, am I correct
3	that one of the discretionary factors that
4	you believe would be appropriate is whether
5	the company committed a legal violation that
6	threatened safety?
7	A That would be a good criteria to
8	include in that exercise of discretion, yes.
9	Q Another discretionary factor would
10	be whether the company committed negligent
11	acts that threatened safety; correct?
12	(Reporter interruption.)
13	BY MR. RUTTEN:
14	Q Another factor to be considered in
15	the exercise of this discretion in your view
16	would be whether the company committed
17	negligent acts that threatened safety; is
18	that correct?
19	A What we say here by the way, we
20	identify criteria that could be identified.
21	Again, these are suggestions to
22	PG&E and one of them is whether the company
23	committed imprudent or negligent acts that
24	threatened safety.
25	Q That's the second factor.
26	The third factor you list is
27	whether the company engaged in criminal
28	conduct; correct?

Α That is another potential 1 2 criterion. And the fourth factor is the 3 0 magnitude of damage to persons or property 4 from the event; correct? 5 6 Α Yes. 7 0 So those four factors that you've listed are not exhaustive; are they? 8 9 Α No. In fact, as I said, those are 10 criteria that we're suggesting that could be 11 included, but those are not meant to be an exhaustive list. 12 Are you able to give us an 13 14 exhaustive list of all the factors that should be considered in this discretionary 15 16 determination? 17 Α Not as sit here, no. 18 0 In fact, you would agree it's 19 impossible for us to be in this room today to 2.0 foresee all the facts and circumstances 21 surrounding some future event that might 22 appropriately be considered in this exercise of discretion? 2.3 24 Well, I -- maybe, but I don't see 25 that as a reason to not have some criteria that bound the discretion. 26 27 Again, just as the Commission has criteria that bound its discretion in fixing 2.8

1	a penalty amount, yes, there is discretion,
2	but there's some guidance to that, some
3	standard to fix the compensation again.
4	MR. RUTTEN: Thank you, Mr. Long.
5	Nothing further, your Honor.
6	ALJ ALLEN: Mr. Bloom.
7	CROSS-EXAMINATION
8	BY MR. BLOOM:
9	Q Good afternoon, Mr. Long.
10	A Good afternoon.
11	Q In your testimony you call for
12	interventionist measures, commitments that
13	are necessary to prevent future occurrences
14	of safety failures that have plagued PG&E and
15	victimized communities; is that correct?
16	A We're saying, this is an occasion
17	for the Commission to maybe be more
18	interventionist than it might otherwise be
19	comfortable with.
20	Q And when you talk about the
21	"victimized communities it serves," I assume
22	your reference would certainly include the
23	wildfire victims?
24	A Yes.
25	Q Can you explain or give a little
26	more detail on what the goal is and why you
27	want interventionist measures.
28	A Well, every word of my testimony is

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for the purpose of trying to get PG&E to be a safe company, and we've devoted a lot of time and attention to safety-related proceedings at the PUC, and we think we have some constructive suggestions to offer to improve PG&E's ability to operate as a safe utility so that's the perspective from which we come.

Q Would you agree that the goal is to identify problems, issues, before they progress to a safety failure or some type of catastrophic event or problem?

A Absolutely.

What we've learned in the past is there can be latent problems that are not known that prove catastrophic, and I'm particularly thinking of the San Bruno explosion where there was what turned out to be an extremely dangerous piece of pipe sitting under the community of San Bruno that PG&E did not know was in that condition, and I'm also thinking about the Camp Fire where there was an old kind of transmission tower that needed attention that PG&E did not do anything about.

Q So would I be correct in categorizing or -- your proposals, the idea is to minimize the risk of a safety failure that would result in similar harm to

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A Certainly.

Q And would you accept that the existence of the intervention strategies or intervention measures that you set forth could provide at least some piece of mind to victims of the fires that there's a system in place to identify things, and, hopefully, minimize the risk of a future catastrophic event or other harm that they might be exposed to?

A Well, I hope that everything that PG&E suggests and the additional measures that we suggest can give us a little more confidence that the utility will operate more safely than it has in the past. And, again, that's the goal.

I also say that I'm not confident, based on what I've seen from PG&E, that even TURN's own recommended measures are ultimately going to do the job because it depends very much how they are implemented by a company that doesn't have a good track record.

And so that's why I suggest that the Commission hold over the utility the potential for revocation of its CPCN as something that will, hopefully, focus PG&E's

collective minds and efforts even more 1 2. sharply than they have been in the past. 3 So leaving aside whether we agree the CPCN and whatever might be on the table 4 5 or not, you call in your testimony for what 6 you call "transformational change that's 7 needed," and you identify that the most significant measure that would reflect such 9 change is the regionalization concept of the 10 plan that at this point has not been 11 developed or brought to the Commission; is 12 that correct? 13 MR. FINKELSTEIN: If I could interject 14 just so I can track along. Can we get a page 15 cite to the specific part of the testimony 16 you're referring to? 17 MR. BLOOM: Sure. 18 THE WITNESS: Based on my table of 19 contents, it looks like it's page 25. 2.0 MR. FINKELSTEIN: Thank you. 21 Thank you, Mr. Bloom. 22 THE WITNESS: I think what I state is 2.3 that -- and maybe there was another place where I addressed it as well, but I think 24 25 what I state is that of the measures that PG&E has identified as initiatives that it's 26 27 arrived at in consultations with the Governor's Office, this one, the 2.8

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Regionalization Initiative, has the potential 1 2. to be closer to transformative than anything 3 else that I see; however, on page 25, I say that, just as you've said in your question, 4 it's very much undeveloped, and it's very 5 hard to tell whether it will indeed -- how 6 7 transformative it would really be until we see the details. BY MR. BLOOM: 9

Q Just for the clarity of the record, I did have it highlighted. It's on page 2, and you say, quote, "Probably the most significant of the measures in PG&E's testimony is the regionalization concept, but that is not yet a concrete proposal that can be assessed for its ability to improve the safety of PG&E operations." So that is the sentence I was referring to on page 2.

A Thank you.

Q Just so I can understand, since we all understand, not just from you, frankly, but from a lot of the testimony as well as from in the reply testimony, that the regionalization concept has not been developed or brought to the Commission, and there are proposals that will be brought in the future, maybe in the next general rate case as part of that filing, and we had

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testimony that it may take a year or two or 1 2. more to implement, and then a while to figure 3 out. Could you tell us what TURN is 4 looking for in terms of what happens in the 5 6 meantime. Where do we go in terms of the 7 short term versus the longer term, and particularly in light of the need for the 9 Commission to approve a plan or to reach its 10 decision in the next 60 days? 11 Α That's what my testimony speaks to. 12 I'm not going to -- I'm not going to restate everything in my testimony, but we make a 13 14 number of recommendations in my testimony 15 that we hope will improve be the ability of 16 PG&E to operate safety. 17 We will also be speaking in our 18 pleading on May 13th to the assigned 19 Commissioner ruling proposals. So we're 2.0 going to be -- my testimony addresses that. 21 We're going to be further addressing it in 22 our brief and in our comments. 2.3 Just to be clear, you're not 24 proposing this be held back until this 25 restructuring proposal is brought to the Commission, considered and ruled on? 26 27 There's a number of interim things

that you may or may not propose and the

1	Commission may adopt, but
2	A I'm sorry. You used a "this" there
3	and I didn't know what you meant by "this."
4	Maybe you could start your question again.
5	Q You are not proposing in this
6	proceeding that the decision of the
7	Commission be held back in terms of
8	compliance to AB 1054 until that
9	restructuring organizational plan is brought
10	to the Commission and decided upon?
11	A No. That is not our proposal.
12	MR. BLOOM: Thank you, your Honor. I
13	have no further questions.
14	ALJ ALLEN: Is there any further
15	Mr. Abrams?
16	MR. ABRAMS: May I take three minutes?
17	ALJ ALLEN: Three minutes is fine.
18	CROSS-EXAMINATION
19	BY MR. ABRAMS:
20	Q Do you agree, Mr. Long, that any
21	use of the victims or the victim's trust to
22	adversely affect rates should be avoided by
23	the Commission?
24	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Objection; beyond the
25	scope.
26	MR. ABRAMS: It's related
27	ALJ ALLEN: I'm not clear exactly what
28	you're asking, Mr. Abrams. I mean, it seems

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like knowing this is from TURN that, essentially, if he understood it, the answer is going to be "no" and "no." He doesn't want to harm victims and he doesn't want to increase rates. So I'm not sure what you're trying to get with that question. Can you try to refocus or rephrase.

MR. ABRAMS: Sure.

Q To whatever extent that the plan of reorganization leverages the victims and the victims' trust to adversely affect rates is in the purview of the Commission and should be avoided through the Plan of Reorganization?

A Well, let me try to answer your question this way: The fact that the plan has wildfire victims, whatever word we use, becoming shareholders of the company could lead to a situation in which arguments are made by PG&E that if, for example, TURN seeks a disallowance based on imprudence, that TURN's recommendation should be rejected because it would be harmful to not just the general body of shareholders, but to this new group of shareholders, the wildfire victims, that's something that if the Commission approves this plan, it should be very attentive to.

1	That should not be an additional
2	factor that weighs on the scale of the
3	Commission's determinations about whether
4	to the Commission's determinations in
5	setting meeting its statutory obligation
6	of ensuring just and reasonable rates.
7	MR. ABRAMS: Thank you.
8	Thank you, your Honor.
9	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Abrams.
10	Any redirect?
11	MR. FINKELSTEIN: No, your Honor.
12	Thank you.
13	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
14	Mr. Long, you are excused.
15	My understanding is this completes
16	the cross-examination; am I correct?
17	(No response.)
18	ALJ ALLEN: I see nods. I don't see
19	anyone telling me I'm wrong. So thank you,
20	everyone.
21	Let's move into the housekeeping. I
22	think we have exhibits to move into the
23	record. Why don't we start with
24	Mr. Finkelstein.
25	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Sure. I'd like to
26	start with the documents that were just the
27	subject of Mr. Long's testimony on
28	cross-examination. That would be what's

1	your preference, one at a time? Can I list
2	three?
3	ALJ ALLEN: So what I have is TURN-01,
4	which is the Prepared Reply Testimony of
5	Thomas Long.
6	TURN-01-A, previously marked, which
7	is the Attachments to the Prepared Testimony
8	of Thomas Long.
9	TURN-01-E, the Errata to Prepared
10	Testimony.
11	And TURN-02, TURN's Responses to
12	PG&E Data Request. This is separate from any
13	cross exhibits.
14	Did I identify those non-cross
15	exhibits accurately?
16	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Yes.
17	ALJ ALLEN: And I take it, you wish to
18	move those into the record?
19	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Yes. Please.
20	ALJ ALLEN: Is there any objection to
21	TURN-01, TURN-01-A, TURN-01-E or TURN-02?
22	(No response.)
23	ALJ ALLEN: Seeing none. Those
24	exhibits are admitted.
25	(Exhibit No. TURN-01, TURN-01-A were received into evidence.)
26	(Exhibit No. TURN-01-E, TURN-02 were
27	received into evidence.)
28	ALJ ALLEN: Mr. Finkelstein, I assume

1	there are other exhibits as well.
2	MR. FINKELSTEIN: There are, your
3	Honor.
4	ALJ ALLEN: Let's go off the record.
5	(Off the record.)
6	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
7	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Your Honor, TURN
8	would also move for introduction into the
9	record of what's been marked as
10	TURN/EPUC/IS-01, and TURN/EPUC/IS-01-A, and
11	TURN/EPUC/IS-01 being the Prepared Testimony
12	of Robert Finkelstein, and 01-A being the
13	Attachments thereto.
14	ALJ ALLEN: Is there any objection to
15	receiving TURN/EPUC/IS-01, or 01-A?
16	(No response.)
17	ALJ ALLEN: Seeing none. Those
18	exhibits are admitted.
19	(Exhibit No. TURN/EPUC/IS-01, TURN/EPUC/IS-01-A were received into
20	evidence.)
21	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Finkelstein.
22	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Your Honor, I think
23	that TURN has some number of
24	cross-examination exhibits, if we can do
25	those as well now.
26	ALJ ALLEN: Let's do that. I have a
27	list.
28	MR. FINKELSTEIN: That would be very

1	helpful.
2	(Off the record.)
3	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
4	In terms of TURN's cross-examination
5	exhibits, TURN-X-02 we've already marked as
6	received. So the ones that have not been
7	received are TURN-X-03, X-05, X-06, X-07,
8	X-08, and X-09.
9	Is there any party who wishes me to
10	identify those specifically, or is there any
11	objection to the receipt of any of those
12	exhibits?
13	MR. WEISSMANN: Are we off?
14	ALJ ALLEN: Off the record.
15	(Off the record.)
16	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
17	I see no objection to the admission
18	of TURN X-03 through X-09, and so those will
19	be admitted.
20	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Thank you, your
21	Honor.
22	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
23	(Exhibit No. TURN-X-03, TURN-X-04, TURN-X-05, TURN-X-06 were received
24	into evidence.)
25	(Exhibit No. TURN-X-07, TURN-X-08, TURN-X-09 were received into
26	evidence.)
27	ALJ ALLEN: Are there any other
28	exhibits for TURN?

1	MR. FINKELSTEIN: Not that I know of,
2	your Honor.
3	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
4	Off the record.
5	(Off the record.)
6	ALJ ALLEN: Ms. Hong.
7	MS. HONG: Thank you, your Honor.
8	At this time I would like to move
9	for admission into the record the following
10	exhibits: What has been marked as Exhibit
11	CCSF-01, the Prepared Reply Testimony of
12	Margaret A. Meal on behalf of the City and
13	County of San Francisco.
14	What has been marked CCSF-01-E,
15	Errata to Prepared Reply Testimony of
16	Margaret A. Meal on behalf of the City and
17	County of San Francisco.
18	What has been marked as Exhibit
19	CCSF-02, CCSF Responses to PG&E's Data
20	Request, Set CCSF-001, exclamation mark,
21	Questions 1 through 7, 10 through 14, and 18
22	and 19.
23	And, finally, what has been marked
24	as Exhibit CCSF-03, CCSF's Responses to
25	PG&E's Data Request, Set CCSF-001,
26	exclamation mark, Questions 8 and 9 and 15
27	through 17.
28	ALJ ALLEN: Is there any objection to

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1	the admission of Exhibits CCSF-01, CCSF-01-E,
2	CCSF-02, and CCSF-03? Seeing none, those
3	exhibits are received.
4	(Exhibit Nos. CCSF-01, CCSF-01-E, CCSF-02, and CCSF-03 were received
5	into evidence.)
6	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you, Ms. Hong.
7	MS. HONG: Thank you, your Honor.
8	ALJ ALLEN: Mr. Miley.
9	MR. MILEY: Thank you, your Honor.
10	Matt Miley, Public Advocates Office. Public
11	Advocates Office requests that two exhibits
12	be received into evidence. Those have been
13	marked as Cal Advocates-X-01, those are data
14	request responses.
15	The second exhibit is Cal
16	Advocates-X-02, which is an excerpt from
17	PG&E's 10K form.
18	ALJ ALLEN: Is there any objection to
19	the receipt of Cal Advocates-X-01 and Cal
20	Advocates-X-02? Seeing none, those exhibits
21	are received.
22	(Exhibit Nos. CAL ADV-X-01 and CAL ADV-X-02 were received into
23	evidence.)
24	MR. MILEY: Thank you.
25	ALJ ALLEN: Any others whose parties
26	are present? Let's go ahead and start with
27	PG&E.
28	Off the record.

1	(Off the record.)
2	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
3	What I have in terms of prepared
4	testimony, Mr. Weissmann, I have PG&E-01,
5	PG&E-02, PG&E-03, PG&E-04, PG&E-05, PG&E-06,
6	and PG&E-07. We'll get to PG&E-08
7	momentarily. Those were prepared testimony
8	through Number 6. Number 7 was Supplemental
9	Testimony Including Errata.
10	Are there any objections to the
11	receipt of PG&E-01 through PG&E-07? Seeing
12	none, PG&E-01 through PG&E-07 are admitted.
13	(Exhibit Nos. PG&E-01 through PG&E-07 were received into
14	evidence.)
15	ALJ ALLEN: Off the record.
16	(Off the record.)
17	ALJ ALLEN: On the record. We have
18	also previously identified PG&E-08, PG&E-09,
19	PG&E-10, PG&E-11, PG&E-12, PG&E-13, PG&E-14,
20	and PG&E-15 during an off-the-record
21	conversation. It appears there's no
22	objection to receipt of those; is that
23	correct?
24	Any objection to the receipt of
25	PG&E-08 through PG&E-15? Seeing none, those
26	are admitted.
27	(Exhibit Nos. PG&E-08 through PG&E-15 were received into
28	evidence.)

1	ALJ ALLEN: Finally, there's PG&E
2	cross-examination exhibits. PG&E-X-01,
3	PG&E-X-02, PG&E-X-03, PG&E-X-04, PG&E-X-05,
4	PG&E-X-06, and PG&E-X-07.
5	Is there any objection to the
6	receipt of Exhibits PG&E-X-01 through
7	PG&E-X-07? Seeing no objection, those are
8	received.
9	(Exhibit Nos. PG&E-X-01 through PG&E-X-07 were received into
10	evidence.)
11	ALJ ALLEN: Any others, Mr. Weissmann?
12	MR. WEISSMANN: No, your Honor.
13	ALJ ALLEN: Off the record.
14	(Off the record.)
15	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
16	There are three exhibits that were
17	marked for Marin Clean Energy, MCE-X-01,
18	MCE-X-02, and MCE-X-03.
19	Is there any objection to the
20	receipt of those three exhibits? Seeing
21	none, those three are admitted or received,
22	whichever term you prefer, but they are in
23	the record.
24	(Exhibit Nos. MCE-X-01 through
25	MCE-X-03 were received into evidence.)
26	MR. WEISSMANN: Sorry, your Honor,
27	would you be so kind as to identify those for
28	the record. I don't have them.

1	ALJ ALLEN: Yes. Actually, it looks as
2	though X-01 and X-02 are identified for the
3	record. X-03 may not have been. So MCE-X-01
4	is Marin Clean Energy Cross-Examination
5	Exhibit for Witness Wells. It's a thick
6	multi-page document.
7	It has a number of attachments. It
8	appears to consist of six different
9	documents. The second one, MCE-X-02, is an
10	excerpt from the PG&E Wildfire Safety Plan.
11	It says "Pacific Gas and Electric Company
12	Amended 2019 Wildfire Safety Plan,
13	February 6, 2019."
14	MCE-X-03, I don't know if this was
15	used or not because it doesn't appear to have
16	been identified oh, no, it was identified
17	on the record. It didn't get marked on here.
18	Excuse me. MCE-X-03 is a PG&E data response
19	for various witnesses, PG&E Data Response
20	CCSF-001, Q 01-36.
21	MR. WEISSMANN: Could we be off the
22	record for just a moment?
23	ALJ ALLEN: Yes, off the record.
24	(Off the record.)
25	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
26	Just confirming there is no
27	objection to the receipt of MCE-X-01, X-02 or
28	X-03; is that correct? Those remain

1	received.
2	And then there are two exhibits for
3	Small Business Utility Advocates, SBUA-01 is
4	the Reply Testimony of Expert Ted Howard,
5	that was the initial testimony, and
6	SBUA-X-02, Cross-Examination Hearing Exhibit
7	entitled "PG&E Risk Register."
8	Is there any objection to the
9	receipt of SBUA-01 or SBUA-X-02? Seeing
10	none, those two are admitted as well.
11	(Exhibit Nos. SBUA-01 and SBUA-X-02
12	were received into evidence.)
13	ALJ ALLEN: Off the record.
14	(Off the record.)
15	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
16	Let me start with Exhibits Abrams-01
17	and Abrams-06. Abrams-01 is William B.
18	Abrams' Reply Testimony dated February 21st.
19	Abrams-06 was the previously-served William
20	B. Abrams' Opening Testimony on Nonfinancial
21	Issues dated December 13, 2019.
22	Is there any objection to the
23	receipt of those two exhibits? Seeing none,
24	those two exhibits are admitted.
25	(Exhibit Nos. Abrams-01 and Abrams-06 were received into
26	evidence.)
27	ALJ ALLEN: Off the record.
28	(Off the record.)

1	ALJ ALLEN: On the record.
2	Mr. Abrams, I assume that you wish
3	to have your exhibits admitted into the
4	record, the remaining exhibits?
5	MR. ABRAMS: I do, your Honor.
6	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. For exhibits
7	Abrams-X-05 and Abrams-X-10, is there any
8	objection to receipt of those two exhibits?
9	Seeing none, those two are admitted.
10	(Exhibit Nos. Abrams-X-05 and Abrams-X-10 were received into
11	evidence.)
12	ALJ ALLEN: I understand there may be
13	some objections to some of the other exhibits
14	so let's walk through those one at a time.
15	Is there an objection to Abrams-X-02?
15 16	Is there an objection to Abrams-X-02? MR. WEISSMANN: Yes.
16	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes.
16 17	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes. ALJ ALLEN: And what is the nature of
16 17 18	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes. ALJ ALLEN: And what is the nature of that objection?
16 17 18 19	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes. ALJ ALLEN: And what is the nature of that objection? MR. WEISSMANN: Abrams-X-02 is
16 17 18 19 20	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes. ALJ ALLEN: And what is the nature of that objection? MR. WEISSMANN: Abrams-X-02 is Mr. Abrams' pleading in the bankruptcy court.
16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes. ALJ ALLEN: And what is the nature of that objection? MR. WEISSMANN: Abrams-X-02 is Mr. Abrams' pleading in the bankruptcy court. It's a motion for reconsideration. I object
16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes. ALJ ALLEN: And what is the nature of that objection? MR. WEISSMANN: Abrams-X-02 is Mr. Abrams' pleading in the bankruptcy court. It's a motion for reconsideration. I object on two grounds; first, lack of foundation,
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes. ALJ ALLEN: And what is the nature of that objection? MR. WEISSMANN: Abrams-X-02 is Mr. Abrams' pleading in the bankruptcy court. It's a motion for reconsideration. I object on two grounds; first, lack of foundation, and, second, I don't recall this exhibit
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes. ALJ ALLEN: And what is the nature of that objection? MR. WEISSMANN: Abrams-X-02 is Mr. Abrams' pleading in the bankruptcy court. It's a motion for reconsideration. I object on two grounds; first, lack of foundation, and, second, I don't recall this exhibit being used in cross-examination.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes. ALJ ALLEN: And what is the nature of that objection? MR. WEISSMANN: Abrams-X-02 is Mr. Abrams' pleading in the bankruptcy court. It's a motion for reconsideration. I object on two grounds; first, lack of foundation, and, second, I don't recall this exhibit being used in cross-examination. ALJ ALLEN: Mr. Abrams, response?

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I am

that are the subject of this proceeding. 1 2. Specifically, my pleading talks to safety and security issues which are central to the 3 Commission's decision and, therefore, I think 4 the exhibit is rightfully put into the 5 6 record. 7 I also discuss that, even though I did not reference specific line items within 8 9 that, I did reference those arguments in my 10 cross-examination. 11 ALJ ALLEN: Am I correct that this 12 document is a motion that you filed in the 13 bankruptcy court and accordingly are 14 essentially arguments that you are making in 15 the bankruptcy court? 16 They are arguments that I MR. ABRAMS: 17 am making in the bankruptcy court that are 18 also the arguments PG&E is making in the 19 bankruptcy court, there are arguments that 2.0 victims are making in the bankruptcy court. 21 It is amongst many arguments that are in the 22 bankruptcy court that are relevant to this 2.3 proceeding. 24 Well, Mr. Abrams, much of ALJ ALLEN: 25 what happens coming out of the bankruptcy 26 court is relevant to this proceeding. 27 is not a forum to re-litigate or repeat

arguments made in the bankruptcy court.

going to not admit Exhibit X-02. 1 2. Let's move to Exhibit X-03. 3 MR. WEISSMANN: Same objections, your Honor. 4 MR. ABRAMS: Can you specify what that 5 6 X-03 is, please, first. 7 ALJ ALLEN: Yes. Abrams-X-03 is a pleading from the United States Bankruptcy Court, William B. Abrams' Objection to 9 10 Debtor's Motion Pursuant to 11 USC, et 11 cetera, again about the restructuring 12 agreement. Do you have anything additional to 13 14 say on this specific document? 15 MR. ABRAMS: Yes, your Honor. This 16 motion is directly related to the financing 17 of the Plan of Reorganization, which is 18 central to the Commission's decision. 19 disagree strenuously with having only the 2.0 documents and the testimony that PG&E would like to take under consideration rather than 21 22 those of opponents. 2.3 Well, certainly, ALJ ALLEN: 24 Mr. Abrams, you have been free to submit 25 This, again, is testimony and have done so. 26 an argument made to the bankruptcy court. 27 am not going to admit Abrams-X-03. Let's go to Abrams-X-04. This one is victim letters 2.8

1	to the court.
2	Your objection on this,
3	Mr. Weissmann.
4	MR. WEISSMANN: Same objections and
5	also hearsay.
6	ALJ ALLEN: This one he did lay a
7	foundation on it and there was some
8	discussion of this one. I am going to admit
9	this to the record. It's not going to get a
10	large amount of weight because, as I noticed
11	at the time, these are all letters from fire
12	victims to Judge Montali in the bankruptcy
13	court. So, the relationship to this
14	proceeding is somewhat attenuated, but I will
15	admit Exhibit X-04 to the record.
16	MR. ABRAMS: Your Honor, if I can add
17	something to that. I don't want to sell past
18	sold, but can I add something to the record?
19	ALJ ALLEN: On that exhibit?
20	MR. ABRAMS: Yes.
21	ALJ ALLEN: No. Let's move on to
22	exhibit X-07.
23	Mr. Weissmann, your objection to
24	Abrams-X-07.
25	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes. X-07 is a
26	statement filed on the bankruptcy court on
27	behalf of Governor Newsom regarding the
28	submission by the debtors. Our objections to

1	this is lack of foundation. It's an argument
2	to the bankruptcy court similar to your
3	treatment of X-02 and X-03. Again, I believe
4	there was an objection made at the time and
5	that objection was sustained, I believe.
6	MR. ALCANTAR: Your Honor, may I weigh
7	in on one aspect of this. There are several
8	references in the record, particularly from
9	Mr. Johnson's testimony to correspondence
10	from the governor expressing views. It seems
11	to me that the information additive to that
12	communication is in fact probative in this
13	case. I would request that you'd at least
14	consider those thoughts as you look at this
15	exhibits.
16	MR. WEISSMANN: I agree
17	ALJ ALLEN: Hold on a second.
18	I'm sorry, I didn't hear the last
19	thing you said, Mr. Alcantar.
20	MR. ALCANTAR: Just in favor of
21	considering those thoughts as you consider
22	this exhibit.
23	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
24	MR. WEISSMANN: May I briefly remark
25	that I did not object to Abrams-X-05, which
26	was the letter from the governor.
27	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you.
28	Mr. Abrams.

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That

The objections that 1 MR. ABRAMS: Yes. 2. are in X-07 directly reference the California Public Utilities Commission's proceedings, so 3 I couldn't think of anything more relevant than a description of the California Public 5 Utilities Commission's proceedings and is 6 7 objections to how PG&E is conducting themselves in this proceeding. 8 9 ALJ ALLEN: Well, Mr. Abrams, there are 10 a great many things that reference the Public 11 Utilities Commission that do not come into 12 the evidentiary record at our particular proceeding. I am trying to recall at the 13 14 time this was offered, was this used in 15 cross-examination? 16 MR. ABRAMS: Yes, it was. 17 ALJ ALLEN: I'm not recalling the 18 objection. 19 Mr. Manheim. 2.0 MR. MANHEIM: Yeah, your Honor, I 21 believe ALJ Cooke was presiding that day, but 22 I objected to the use of the document for lack of foundation and for relevance since 2.3 24 it's a bankruptcy pleading. That objection 25 was sustained. There were no questions 26 allowed with respect to that document. 27 MR. ABRAMS: That's untrue. It was not

no objections related to that document.

1	was never stated.
2	ALJ ALLEN: Okay.
3	MR. ABRAMS: Never stated.
4	ALJ ALLEN: Okay. Slow down because
5	we're still on the record here. I'm going to
6	hold off a moment on X-07. We'll come back
7	to that. Let's move on to Abrams-X-08. This
8	is another document. This is Objection of
9	Governor Gavin Newsom to Debtor's Amended
10	Motion for Entry of Orders. I guess the same
11	arguments would apply to this one; is that
12	correct, Mr. Weissmann, Mr. Alcantar, and
13	Mr. Abrams?
14	MR. ABRAMS: Yes, your Honor.
15	MR. ALCANTAR: Yes, your Honor.
16	MR. ABRAMS: And the same foundation
17	that I described before regarding X-07
18	applies to this.
19	ALJ ALLEN: Thank you. So the answer
20	is yes; correct?
21	MR. ABRAMS: The answer is yes.
22	ALJ ALLEN: Moving to Abrams-X-09, this
23	is an article by Sam Licardo.
24	Mr. Weissmann.
25	MR. WEISSMANN: Yes, your Honor. This
26	document was used in cross-examination of
27	Mr. Wells. We would not object to the
28	admission for the limited purpose of setting

	1
1	a context for Mr. Wells' questions and
2	answers, but we do object to consideration of
3	the substance of the opinions that the author
4	of that article set forth since the author
5	was not present.
6	I think the way that it was
7	presented was Mr. Abrams read certain
8	passages and asked Mr. Wells if he agreed or
9	disagreed. For that limited purpose, we
10	don't object.
11	ALJ ALLEN: Yeah, given that it is an
12	article, the article is essentially what it
13	is. It is essentially a form of hearsay. I
14	will admit it for that purpose and will not
15	be basing any factual determinations in this
16	proceeding on, but Abrams-X-09 is received.
17	(Exhibit No. Abrams-X-09 was
18	received into evidence.)
19	ALJ ALLEN: That leaves us with
20	Abrams-X-07 and Abrams-X-08. I am going to
21	admit those for essentially the limited
22	purpose for background material essentially
23	along the grounds that Mr. Alcantar has
24	identified. So, Abrams-X-07 and Abrams-X-08
25	are admitted.
26	(Exhibit Nos. Abrams-X-07 and
27	Abrams-X-08 were received into evidence.)
28	ALJ ALLEN: Anything else we need to

1	address at this time? I am planning to try
2	and issue, hopefully soon, a written ruling
3	that formalizes the schedule for going
4	forward. I did rule on that from the bench
5	so that is the schedule going forward.
6	The reason for the written ruling
7	would be to make sure that it's publicly
8	available and that everyone has access to it.
9	I do not intend to change that ruling I did
10	from the bench that adopts the proposed
11	schedule developed by the parties.
12	Is there anything else we need to
13	address today? Thank you very much. Thank
14	you to all the parties. This hearing is
15	adjourned.
16	(Whereupon, at the hour of 3:00 p.m., this matter having been continued
17	to 10:00 a.m., March 18, 2020, at San Francisco, California, the
18	Commission then adjourned.)
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1	BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
2	OF THE
3	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
4	
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6	CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDING
7	I, ANDREA L. ROSS, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
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14	EVENTS OF THE MATTER OR THE OUTCOME OF THE PROCEEDING.
15	EXECUTED THIS MARCH 06, 2020.
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19	Andrew Noss
21	ANDREA L. ROSS CSR NO. 7896
22	CSR NO. 7090
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